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ABSTRACT 
Multi-player interactions and vertical relationships in the U.S. containerized-import 
shipment market are investigated using game theory approaches. Bi-level programming 
problems (BLPP) are built to capture the hierarchy structure of the container shipping industry, 
whereas the ocean carriers (OC) are considered as the market leader. For a case study with five 
players from several levels of the shipment chain, 16 BLPPs are built to analyze the 32 coalition 
possibilities. Two routes are compared: The West Coast route (WCR) includes one terminal (P1) 
and one railroad (R); the East Coast route (ECR) includes a second terminal (P2) and the Panama 
Canal (PC). The impact of Panama Canal expansion is investigated by comparing scenarios with 
different assumptions of vessel size. Capacity constraints at port terminals are also analyzed by 
assuming different capacity levels.  
The grand coalition of the five players is found to be very unstable because of the 
unavoidable competition within the coalition; hence, following games are further created, 
supposing the grand coalition could not form. Model results indicate the OC prefers to form an 
East Coast Coalition (ECC) with East Coast players if the grand coalition could not form.  
Sensitivity analyses on some parameter values for the grand coalition and for the ECC 
bring some interesting findings. With higher cargo values, the WCR becomes more appealing 
because of its quicker delivery time and lower inventory costs compared with the ECR. The 
Panama Canal expansion will improve market power and profit shares for the East Coast players 
if the canal operator could increase its competitive price more than the increase of costs. 
Generally, a player will gain more market power if its cost could be reduced. A player’s upper 
bound rate is a reflection of its relative market power. But in a complicated market characterized 
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with various cooperation-competition strategies and an ambiguous definition of partners and 
competitors, the impact of a player’s upper bound rate on the market power structure could not 
be easily explained. For future research, the challenge mainly lies on the large number of BLPPs 
that need to be constructed and solved in order to study more players. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
The economic background for this dissertation is briefly discussed first, including the 
container-shipping market problems, market structures, port competition, and relationships 
among players along the container shipment chains. Research problems and objectives are 
introduced in the second section. The organization of the whole dissertation is given in the end.  
1.1. Background 
1.1.1. Uncertainties in the World Container Shipping Market  
There are many issues confronting the container shipping industry: uncertainty in the 
world economy and international trade, over-capacity caused by orders placed before the 
economic crisis, fierce competition within the industry (or from outside), etc. Overall, the global 
container market has been growing fast. Since 2005, the containership fleet has nearly tripled. 
The world merchant fleet reached almost 1.4 billion deadweight tons (DWT) in January 2011, an 
increase of 120 million DWT over 2010. New deliveries stood at 150 million DWT, despite 
approximately 30 million DWT of demolitions and other withdrawals from the market. The 
surge in the capacity supply makes the competition even harder than it was previously 
(UNCTAD 2011).  
Developments in world seaborne trade and the shipping industry mirrored the 
performance of the broad world economy. Seaborne trade is subject to the same uncertainties and 
shocks that may undermine the prospects of a sustained recovery. From 1995 to 2009, the 
continuing expansion on three major East-West container routes was compelling, followed by a 
drastic drop in 2009 because of the 2008 world economy downturn. Container carriers decreased 
their production levels and scrapped old equipment, including ships and container boxes, to cut 
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costs. With the world economic situation brightening in 2010, the seaborne trade volumes 
recorded a positive turnaround, especially in the dry bulk and container trade segments. In 2010, 
global container trade volumes bounced back at 12.9% over the 2009 level with a demand surge 
for almost all trade lanes, which were among the strongest growth rates in the history of 
containerization. With trade growing at an unexpectedly fast rate, a capacity shortage was 
observed in the fourth quarter of 2009 and early 2010 (UNCTAD 2011). 
Another major uncertainty for U.S. containerized import distribution is the Panama Canal 
expansion. Currently, the maximum capacity of a ship that could cross the Panama Canal (a 
Panamax ship) is 4,800 Twenty-foot Equivalent Units (TEU). By the end of 2014, the Panama 
Canal is scheduled to have completed its greatest expansion, allowing it to handle some of the 
world’s most massive ships. Much bigger ships will be allowed: 50% wider, 25% longer, and a 
volume of more than 12,000 TEUs. The Panama Canal expansion will have deep, but uncertain, 
impacts on U.S. ports as well as the U.S. container import and export flow distributions. Many 
expect a positive impact on the East and Gulf Coast ports, with a slightly negative impact on the 
West Coast ports because more Asian container ships would divert to the other side of the United 
States. Many factors may affect the changes. For example, to accommodate bigger ships, state 
governments and their port authorities along the Gulf and East Coasts are seeking to spend 
billions of dollars dredging their harbors and increasing the minimum depth from 39.5 feet to 50 
feet as quickly as possible. However, U.S. harbor-dredging projects need federal approval and 
funding, which is an enormously complicated process. On the other hand, there are some 
observers who do not necessarily agree that the Panama Canal expansion will have major effects 
on the United States. In a 2010 report, the southern office of the Council of State Governments 
noted that one school of thought contends that East Coast ports are already struggling to handle 
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loads from smaller ships and would not be able to manage bigger ships even if the ports were 
technically deep enough. Others doubt that shipping routes would change that drastically because 
many shippers would still place a premium on speed. Nevertheless, most people still believe the 
forecast based on the Panama Canal expansion; even if it does not play out in the short term, it 
definitely will over time (Holeywell 2012). 
1.1.2. Market Structure of the Ocean Container-Shipping Industry 
Because of the container shipping industry’s instability and fierce competition, ship 
owners and carriers have been making various efforts to minimize the risk and better manage 
their operations, such as varying the cruising speeds at sea and increasing vessel sizes. During a 
time of compressed demand, for example, slow steaming could be implemented to cut fuel costs 
and absorb capacity. A larger vessel size is a classic approach to enhance fuel efficiency, reduce 
average operating cost, and gain higher market power. Market power is concerned with the 
ability of firms to secure stronger positions in their market as a means of achieving competitive 
advantage. Shepherd (1970) defined market power as “the ability of a market participant or 
group of participants to influence price, quality, and the nature of the product in the market 
place.” 
 However, for many shipping companies, these individual approaches are not enough for 
survival; various forms of cooperation agreements, including strategic alliances, mergers, and 
acquisitions, emerged as the most effective method for this industry. The first cooperative 
agreement formed by ocean shipping companies was established in the 1870s in an effort to 
eliminate fierce competition by limiting capacity and fixing freight rates. By 2011, almost all 
global carriers had been involved in some kinds of global alliances, except for the biggest 
companies which have a large fleet and a wide service network, such as the Mediterranean 
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Shipping Company and Maersk Line. Inside the strategic global alliances, various types of 
collaborative agreements between carriers are also very common, such as fleet sharing and route-
services cooperation (Panayides and Wiedmer 2011). And just a few months ago (June 2013), 
the world’s three largest ocean carriers—Maersk Line, Mediterranean Shipping Co., and CMA 
CGM—stunned the industry when they announced they will form a long-term fleet and cargo 
sharing alliance (P3 Network) on Asia-Europe, trans-Pacific and trans-Atlantic routes (Journal of 
Commerce 2013a).  
Based on Panayides and Wiedmer’s (2011) review, the current literature on alliances for 
the container shipping industry is rich in qualitative assessment and lacks quantitative 
evaluations. Franc and Horst (2010) tried to explain why and how shipping lines enlarge their 
scope in intermodal transport using two approaches: Transaction Cost Economics and Resource-
Based View.  
Another unique market formation of the shipping industry is called “Conferences.” The 
Conferences are voluntary associations of container lines that agree to abide by fixed rates for a 
particular trade route in order to stabilize route service (Brooks 1993). The Conferences normally 
require some form of government approval. The abolition of the exemption from anti-trust rules 
by the European Union in 2008 has led companies to seek other forms of collaboration instead of 
the Conference system (Fusillo 2006). The Tioga Group (2007) predicts that Conferences will be 
of little significance in 10 years and that firms will focus on consolidations instead. It believes 
the industry is moving to a two-tiered market structure dominated by global container carriers 
and trade-specific carriers. 
Today, the container shipping industry is highly concentrated. The market share for the 
top 20 liner shipping companies grew to almost 70% of the TEU capacity in January 2011 
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(UNCTAD 2011). The three biggest carriers, APM-Maersk, Mediterranean Shipping Co., and 
CMA CGM Group, controlled over 40% of all vessels that are operated by the top 20 shipping 
lines in 2010 (Panayides and Wiedmer 2011).  
The market structure, Conference systems, mergers, acquisitions, and alliances of the 
ocean shipping industry have important impacts on the container market. However, the market 
structure for ocean shipping, although noted by many studies, is rarely considered in port-choice 
models or spatial-economic models for container flow studies (Panayides and Wiedmer 2011).  
1.1.3. Inter-Port Competition 
World container port throughput increased by an estimated 13.3% to 531.4 million TEUs 
in 2010 after stumbling briefly in 2009. Severe competition for cargo and ships exists between 
ports. The seaports increasingly have to deal with large clients who possess strong bargaining 
power compared with terminal operators and inland transport operators. They are facing the 
constant risk of losing important clients due to reasons that are largely outside their control. For 
example, one big client may stop calling at a port because it has rearranged its service networks 
or has engaged in new partnerships, which may cause the port to lose 10% to as much as 20% of 
the current container traffic (Notteboom 2007) . 
Therefore, in order to attract and retain their clients, port authorities and terminal 
operators are investing significant funds on port facilities to accommodate the increasing levels 
of trade and larger vessels, to alleviate congestion, and to enhance their cargo-handling 
efficiency (Mercator Transport Group 2005, Tioga Group 2007, Hackett 2003). At the national 
level, investment decisions about port expansion, such as dredging channels and rebuilding piers, 
need to be made carefully. Economic, environmental, and political factors have to be considered 
when comparing the nationwide projects. U.S. seaports have to compete for federal approval and 
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funding. For example, the ports of Savannah and Charleston have to compete for a large amount 
of container movement, and both plan to spend almost $4 billion upgrading harbors, docks, and 
terminals (Chapman 2012).  
1.1.4. Vertical Integration of the Shipment Chain 
Major shippers are increasingly expecting one-stop shops to minimize the number of 
third parties. Port users choose a port-oriented supply chain instead of a single port (Magala and 
Sammons 2008). Port competition has moved from between ports to between shipment chains. 
As a result, the worldwide maritime transport chain is perceived as an integrated system.  
From the ocean carriers’ side, inland logistics are becoming more vital for cost cutting. 
Actually, about 40% to 80% of the total costs with container shipping are for land-side 
movements (Notteboom 2004). Although those mega-container vessels continue harvesting 
economies of scale, they also shift the cost burden from the sea to the land and increase the 
importance of coordination along the transport chain. More than just cost saving, control of the 
inland connection is one source of competitive advantage for carriers. Including inland transport 
services and inland terminals as a pool of internal resources and capabilities strengthens the 
competitive advantages and market power for shipping companies. Strategic alliances among the 
shipping companies and coalitions along the shipment chains help firms achieve higher market 
power (Panayides and Wiedmer 2011).  
For that purpose, many ocean carriers have equity interests in stevedoring companies, 
port terminals, inland trucking or rail connections, as well as in forwarding and warehousing 
businesses (Brooks 1993). As a result of concentration and vertical-integration activities, many 
shipping lines are subsidiaries of bigger parent companies, which are able to offer integrated 
services along the entire supply chain. At the end of the 1970s, Sea-land Cooperation, American 
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President Lines, and Maersk Lines were the pioneers in providing door-to-door transport services, 
especially in North America (Hayuth 1987).  
However, firms that lack enough volume or capital access may find it hard to enlarge 
their scopes. Even for those firms that are financially capable, owning equity shares all over the 
global shipping networks is still difficult to manage. As a result, alliances and contracts with 
intermodal service providers, container-management service providers, and container-terminal 
operators are widely applied. These coalitions, although not as tight and reliable as vertical 
integration within a company, have similar benefits.  
1.1.5. Relationships Between Shipping Companies and Other Players 
Franc and Horst (2010) summarized three types of cooperation between ocean carriers 
(OC) and other types of players. The first type is a contract with a risk-bearing commitment 
signed between an OC and rail companies, barge companies, or combined transport operators. 
The second type is minority shares owned by OCs in both transport services and inland terminals. 
The third type is hinterland service subsidiaries of OCs. In the following sub-sections, the typical 
cooperation practice between the shipping companies and other players in the shipment chain is 
discussed briefly.  
Shipping companies’ investments in terminal management are costly but allow the 
companies to provide better service (Álvarez-SanJaime et al. 2013). Owning a dedicated terminal 
could secure berth availability and reliable container flows (Franc and Horst 2010). As for 
contracts between OCs and the ports, they usually involve fixed payments and/or volume 
incentives. Because those contracts are usually long term (10-30 years), they limit the flexibility 
of steamship lines in shifting shipment volumes among the ports (Leachman 2010)  . 
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Railways in North America and trucking companies in Europe have been the target of 
mergers or strategic alliances initiated by ocean carriers. Leachman (2010) reported that, in the 
United States, a steamship line typically selected one railroad to contract for hauling all or nearly 
all its inland point intermodal (IPI) traffic via West Coast ports to Midwestern destinations or to 
gateways with eastern railroads for further shipment to eastern U.S. destinations. Before 2006, 
these contracts were typically long term (8-10 years) at favorable rates. The last of legacy long-
term contracts between steamship lines and railroads expired in 2011. After the expiration, all 
lines will have year-to-year contracts with the railroads at higher rates. 
Another special type of player in the container-shipping chain is the stevedores. For 
decades, carriers and stevedores fiercely battled each other when bargaining about contractual 
arrangements in the key port areas. Negotiations and conflicts between port authorities/operators 
and stevedoring companies are common in the industry. Soppé, Parola, and Frémont (2009) 
empirically demonstrated some early forms of partnerships between the two. Early this year 
(2013), the International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) and the United States Maritime 
Alliance (U.S.MX) tentatively made another six-year master contract that covered 14,500 East 
and Gulf Coast dockworkers after the previous contract expired (Bonney 2012, 2013). In 
addition to contracts and joint ventures, aggressive takeovers are also used as the quickest way to 
penetrate a profitable market that has high barriers to entry.  
1.1.6. Shipment Chain Structures 
The vertical relationship along the shipment links (shippers, ocean carriers, ports, and 
inland carriers) is much like the one in a supply chain (manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and 
consumers). The similarities between the two include three parts: 
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1. Upstream and downstream structures. For intermodal shipment, containers are moved 
from the origin to the destination via different modes in a sequential order. In a 
typical supply chain, producers sell raw materials to manufacturers who then use the 
raw materials to produce cargo and sell to wholesalers/retailers. The final product is 
shipped to final customers by retailers or, sometimes, the wholesalers directly.  
2. Inter-chain competition. A supply chain’s main function is to transform the raw 
materials to the final product and to transport it to the final consumers. A shipment 
chain’s main purpose is to transship the cargo from the origin to the destination. The 
shipment chain may be part of the supply-chain process. No matter if it is a supply 
chain for a certain product or a shipment chain for a shipper, the core services 
provided by the same chain type are essentially the same and could be viewed as 
substitutive goods that compete for the same customers.  
3. Intra-chain cooperation and competition. Because of the chain structure and inter-
chain competition, it is instinctive for players along the same chain to cooperate as a 
group in order to compete with other chains. Note that, with companies integrating 
and enlarging their scope, competition from different echelons also exists. For 
example, a shipping company operating a terminal will compete with other terminal 
operators. A wholesaler that also sells directly to individual customers has 
competition relationships with other pure retailers.  
However, an intermodal shipment chain has some additional characteristics that differ 
from traditional supply chains. For a supply chain, the decision flow is in the opposite direction 
of product flow (Figure 1.1). The product is passed from lower-level players to a higher level 
(e.g., retailers to consumers) while the decision is typically made by the higher-level players (e.g., 
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consumers choose retailers.). As for an intermodal shipment chain, the decision direction is not 
in that order (Figure 1.2). Usually, the customers (shippers or consignees) do not choose specific 
routes or operators. Instead, the decision is often made by a freight forwarder or an ocean carrier.  
 
Figure 1.1. Decision Flow and Product Flow in a Supply Chain 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Decision Flow and Freight Flow in a Container Shipment Chain 
 
Another special characteristic of intermodal shipments is the geographical restrictions on 
the terminal operators and some land carriers. Because the geographical locations could be not 
changed, the choices for partners and competitors are often not flexible. For example, the Los 
Angeles port could hardly cooperate with the Seattle port because their geographical locations 
determine that they are natural competitors. For the Asia to U.S. import, West Coast ports could 
hardly work with the Panama Canal while the Panama Canal may easily establish some kind of 
cooperation with East Coast ports. A railroad company that has no connection to a port currently 
could not cooperate with it in the short term.  
These special structures of the container-import shipment chain, plus the concentrated 
shipping industry, together give ocean shipping companies great market power. The 
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containerized import market has a hierarchy structure, and shipping companies are considered as 
the dominant decision makers in the game.  
1.2. Problem Statement and Research Objectives 
To model the U.S. containerized import spatial distribution, it is preferential to consider 
the entire shipment chain instead of only focusing on one node or one link. Compared with a 
traditional port choice model, which often ignores upper-stream or down-stream logistic 
segments, an integrated-shipment-chain optimization model could more likely reveal the reasons 
behind the port choice, of which the port may or may not have control. Such a model could also 
better predict modal shifting or route changes using sensitivity analysis or stochastic analysis as 
well as better explain congestions.   
However, the single shipment-chain optimization model still misses a critical factor: the 
interactions of multiple players. Different stakeholders along the chain have different, very often 
conflicting, economic goals, and they may have cooperation or competition relationships. Their 
different market powers impact the negotiation process and how the profits/cost savings are 
divided. The optimal shipment routes, volume, and prices are essentially the equilibrium results 
of all players’ interactions.  
The three common methodologies of Freight Network Equilibrium Models, Spatial Price 
Equilibrium Models, and Integrated Network Equilibrium Models have been extensively used in 
the freight-modeling literature (Lee et al. 2012). The Integrated Network Equilibrium Models 
predict freight movements by capturing the behavior and relationship of key stakeholders. 
However, the model typically involves two agents only: the shipper and the carrier. In this study, 
the different cooperation-competition relationships of the various players are investigated using 
game theory solutions. 
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As the previous section has discussed, the shipment chain has many similar 
characteristics as a supply chain. In a supply chain, an echelon stands for the group of players at 
the same level of the chain. Normally, competition exists within one echelon, and cooperation 
exists between the echelons. The different entities’ operational decisions impact each other’s 
profit and, thus, the profit of the entire shipment chain. To effectively model and analyze 
decision making in such a multi-entity situation where the outcome depends on choices made by 
every party, game theory is a natural choice.  
The purpose of this dissertation is to utilize cooperative game theory to solve the U.S. 
containerized import shipment optimization problem so that the problem is not only solved as an 
integrated shipment chain choice, but also as the economic equilibrium resulting from all players’ 
interactions. The players’ profit-seeking behaviors may also disturb the market from its 
equilibrium from time to time. Understanding the behavior of each player and its rationale is 
critical to modeling the container shipping system. For that purpose, tools from the cooperative 
game theory are used to understand, predict, and interpret player relationships, shipping route 
choices, and strategic operational decisions for the complex, multi-agent container shipping 
system.  
The main levels/echelons along the U.S. containerized import chain are as follows: ocean 
carriers (OC), terminal operators, the Panama Canal operator, and land carriers. Several types of 
competition and cooperation could be applied as discussed in the Background section. Because 
the OC acts as the dominant player in the transportation chain, bi-level optimization models 
could be used to represent the competitive relationship between the first-level, OC-led coalition 
and the second-level coalition. Various coalitions and competition-cooperation schemes for the 
main players could be assumed and solved using different bi-level models.  
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Some key questions that this dissertation strives to answer are as follows: What types of 
coalitions will be formed? How should the coalition members divide the profit/cost savings? Is 
the coalition stable? What is the impact of the Panama Canal’s expansion? What factors will 
affect the players’ relative market power? What will happen if some key parameter values are 
changed? This dissertation intends to cast new light onto the U.S. container import market and to 
inspire new research approaches for future studies.  
1.3. Organization of the Dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents an 
extensive review of the related literature about containerized import optimal study and game-
theory applications in the transportation and supply chain fields, and discusses the advantages 
and limitations of the different approaches. Chapter 3 presents the methodology of this study, 
including the preliminaries of cooperative game theory and some classic solution methods. The 
Bi-level Programming Problems are introduced in the end. Chapter 4 explains how the coalition 
values are related to bi-level mathematical models and outlines the basic model components, 
along with different structures for various cooperating schemes. As the complexity of the 
problem arises exponentially with the number of players, Chapter 5 uses a five-player case study 
to illustrate how 16 bi-level models are built for 32 coalitions. Chapter 6 presents the results of 
the case study’s four scenarios, including the Shapley values, Least core, and Minmax core 
solutions. A sensitivity analysis is conducted to analyze the impact of some chosen parameters’ 
values on the model results and cooperative solutions. Chapter 7 continues to present the 
following games because the grand coalition for the case study is found to be unstable. 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted, again, for the smaller coalition. Finally, Chapter 8 summarizes 
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the models, results, and findings of this dissertation first, and then points out some study 
limitations as well as suggestions for solutions and future research directions.  
Four appendixes are included at the end. Appendix A lists the 16 models and constraint 
sets for the case study. Appendixes B and C give the model results for Chapters 6 and 7, 
respectively.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW OF GAME THEORY 
APPLICATIONS 
This chapter presents a review of existing papers and studies on the containerized import 
optimal distribution modeling and game theory applications in the transportation and supply 
chain fields. The benefits of using cooperative game theory (CGT) to consider player interactions 
are discussed. And the limited applications of CGT to transportation and logistics problems in 
the current literature are noticed and explained.  
Approaches to cargo spatial distribution problems could be grouped into two categories 
based on the methods used: One type uses optimization modeling and usually ignores the impact 
of stakeholder interactions. The other type is based on economic equilibrium concepts. In the 
second group, the studies either implicitly model the competition equilibrium of carriers and 
shippers, such as Network Equilibrium Models, or explicity evaluate some types of non-
cooperative or cooperative strategies. From those studies, it should be noticed that more 
comprehensive application of non-cooperative and cooperative game theory approaches to 
freight network planning problems began to merge, although it was at an early stage.    
2.1. Optimization Modeling for Containerized Cargo Flows 
Most optimization modeling of freight distribution problems focused on one type of 
stakeholders. They search for optimal shipment routes, volume, or prices, based on the 
stakeholder’s objective functions, such as minimum cost of shipping companies. Some simply 
try to mimic the observed shipment flow patterns using existing databases and gravity models. 
Among these papers, only Yang, Low, and Tang (2011) acknowledged there are multiple and 
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conflicting objective functions for different stakeholders; but they utilized goal programming to 
handle the problem, which essentially implied a perfect cooperation assumption. 
Fan, Wilson, and Tolliver (2010) developed a linear optimization model to analyze the 
intermodal transportation network of containerized imports to the United States. The shipping 
companies determine optimal flows, ship sizes, ports and rail corridors to minimize cost and 
meet spatial demands for containers. The included costs are vessel operating cost and rail 
charges. Later, the model is used to analyze congestion and stochastic impacts on the container 
shipping network (Fan, Wilson, and Dahl 2012). Other studies on freight network modeling 
include Southworth and Peterson (2000), who analyzed a multimodal freight transportation 
network, and Yang, Low, and Tang (2011), who utilized goal programming to handle multiple 
and conflicting objective functions. The latter study examined the competitiveness of 36 
alternative routings for freight moving in East Asia using an intermodal network optimization 
model.  Levine, Nozick, and Jones (2009) developed a linear optimization model to estimate 
route flows and a corresponding multi-modal origin–destination table for container traffic in the 
United States. An integrated gravity model was built by synthesizing data from 2004 PIERS 
dataset on international trade and the 2003 Carload Waybill sample of domestic railcar 
movements. The origins include 67 foreign countries, while the U.S. destinations are represented 
by 84 Transportation Analysis Zones. Other similar origin-destination matrix studies include 
Silva and D'Agosto (2013), who studied the export flow of Brazilian soybeans based on a 
constrained gravity model. 
 Jula and Leachman (2011b) also built an optimization model on optimal containerized 
imports from Asia to the United States from a supply-chain-management point of view. They 
included inventory cost, in addition to transportation and terminal handling costs, for the 
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importers’ total supply chain cost. Mixed supply chain strategies for each importer (direct 
shipping or consolidation–de-consolidation shipping) were examined. The mixed integer 
nonlinear programming models were solved by a set of heuristic algorithms. To incorporate the 
impact of planning time on the decision-making strategies of different stakeholders, they later 
compared the long-run model to a short-run model (Jula and Leachman 2011a). In the long-run 
model, the mean and standard deviation of container flow times by channel were fixed, assuming 
that existing service quality is maintained by ports and carriers in the long term. The short-run 
model integrated the long-run model with a set of queuing models, which estimates the import 
container flow times through port terminals, rail intermodal terminals, and rail line-haul channels 
as a function of traffic volumes, facility conditions, and staffing hours. The short-run model was 
calculated with iterative runs of the long-run model and the queuing model.  
2.2. Freight Network Equilibrium Model and Spatial Price Equilibrium Model 
Freight planning models study the freight planning process for shippers and carriers. 
Each of the two early types of freight planning models focuses on one group only. The Pure 
Spatial Price Equilibrium Model focuses on the shippers’ equilibrium commodity production, 
consumption, and distribution patterns in spatially separated markets (Samuelson 1952). The 
Freight Network Equilibrium predicts the modal split and network assignment of freight flows 
on a general multimodal transportation network. The equilibrium solution should satisfy 
Wardrop’s First and Second Principles (Sheffi 1985). Wardrop’s First Principle, also called the 
user equilibrium (UE), states that, at equilibrium, all used paths between the same origin-
destination (O-D) pair for the same commodity have equalized lowest cost. This principle is used 
for modeling shippers’ routing decisions. The modified statement implies that each shipper has 
no incentive to unilaterally change routes, paths, or modes at equilibrium because it cannot 
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further reduce its cost. Wardrop’s Second Principle, also called the system optimum (SO), states 
that in order to minimize the total transportation cost, all used paths between the same O-D pair 
for the same commodity have the same lowest marginal cost. This principle applies to the 
carriers’ optimal routing decisions. It is modified to state that, at the optimum, a carrier has no 
incentive to change its routing plan on the sub-network under its control because it cannot further 
reduce its cost. In the simultaneous shipper-carrier equilibrium model, the shippers select optimal 
output, and carriers decide freight rate and shipment route. Both strive to maximize profits.  
Hurley and Petersen (1994) used UE principle to model shipper’s behavior and SO 
principle for the carrier. By using a particular form of nonlinear tariff, they showed that the UE 
and SO can be simultaneously satisfied in an incomplete market. Wie (1995) formulated the 
dynamic mixed behavior traffic network equilibrium model as a non-cooperative N-person 
nonzero-sum game. Interactions of two types of players were considered. The first type is called 
a user equilibrium type, who behaves according to the dynamic user equilibrium principle and 
requires equal average costs at equilibrium. The second type is called a Cournot-Nash type, who 
behaves according to the dynamic SO principle and requires equal marginal costs.  
The distinction between the Spatial Price Equilibrium (SPE) model and the Freight 
Network Equilibrium (FNE) model became less prominent and started to converge three decades 
ago. One example is the Generalized Spatial Price Equilibrium Model (GSPEM) built by Harker 
and Friesz (1986a, b), and which provided an explicit treatment of shippers’ and carriers’ 
behaviors using Wardrop’s two principles, and solved the shippers’ and carriers’ problems 
simultaneously by assuming the marginal cost pricing principle.  
Freight Network Equilibrium Models based on Wardrop’s two principles are essentially 
one type of Nash Equilibrium models. More complicated relationships in the transportation 
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planning problem are investigated later by other researchers using Nash Equilibrium models or 
cooperative game models. In the following sections, those studies are presented according to 
their application fields.  
2.3. Game Theory Application in Ocean Shipping Industry 
Yang, Liu, and Shi (2011) studied the economic performance and stability of shipping 
liner alliance by applying core theory where business cooperation is partly realized by delivering 
joint-service with mega container ships. Compared with non-cooperative games, core theory 
aims to solve problems when players decide to cooperate with tight binding agreements for 
achieving their joint objectives. 
 Examples of game theory application in the port industry include Saeed and Larsen 
(2010), who examined the effects of cooperation in the context of port competition in Pakistan, 
and Ishii et al. (2013), who examined how each port selects port charges strategically in the 
timing of port capacity investment by constructing a non-cooperative game theoretic model. 
Saeed and Larsen (2010) discussed a two-stage game that involves three container terminals 
located in Karachi Port in Pakistan. The first stage is a cooperative game whereas the terminals 
have to decide whether to act as a singleton or to enter a coalition. The second stage is modeled 
as a Bertrand game with the coalition competing with the terminal in Karachi Port (if any) that 
has not joined the coalition by choosing their optimal prices. Thus, three partial coalitions and 
one grand coalition are investigated. Although the authors tried to use the concepts of 
“characteristic function” and “core” to analyze each coalition’s stability, they actually used the 
first order condition of the grand coalition’s profit function to find equilibrium price and profit 
for each terminal. (This approach may be right to get the Nash equilibrium for the Bertrand game, 
but questionable for a cooperative game.) Ishii et al. (2013) constructed a non-cooperative model 
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with stochastic demand for two ports that compete with each other, in order to find how the other 
port should respond in setting prices if a port invests in its capacity and how equilibrium port 
charges are determined under demand uncertainty. The Nash equilibrium is derived and 
propositions are applied to the case of inter-port competition between the ports of Busan and 
Kobe. 
For relationships between different types of players in the ocean shipping market, Lee et 
al. (2012) modeled the interactions of the three types of players in an oligopoly shipping market: 
ocean carriers, land carriers, and port terminal operators. In the three-level non-cooperative 
model, they used Nash Equilibrium to find optimal decisions for each player. The ocean carrier 
is regarded as the leader, while port terminal operators are the followers to the ocean carriers and 
the leaders to the land carriers. At the upper-level interaction, port service charges affect ocean 
carriers’ route choices while ocean carriers’ routing decisions determine port throughput. Ocean 
carriers choose a port terminal based on factors including port location, service charge, and 
inland connections. At the lower-level interaction, service demands of land carriers are 
determined from the port throughputs. Each type of carrier has an objective function of 
maximizing profit. They utilized the Variational Inequality (VI) method to get the Nash 
Equilibrium solution.  
Asgari, Farahani, and Goh (2013) developed a game theoretic network design model that 
considers three scenarios: 1) Perfect competition exists between the hub ports, and shipping 
companies only choose one hub port; 2) Perfect cooperation exists between the hub ports; 3) And 
grand cooperation exists among the shipping companies and the hub ports. The shipping 
companies are considered as the market leader while the two relay hub ports are followers of the 
shipping companies, and are competing to capture more market share from the shipping 
20 
 
companies. At the first level, the shipping companies choose the cheapest path. At the next level, 
the hub ports strive to maximize revenue. An interval branch and bound was designed to solve 
the non-convex nonlinear integer programming model. The scenarios were tested using empirical 
data from two leading Asian hub ports: Singapore and Hong Kong. 
Talley and Ng (2013) proposed a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium model to determine 
the maritime transport chain choice by water carriers, inland carriers, ports, and shippers. They 
stated that a simultaneous solution to the four individual optimization problems for the four 
players gives rise to a real maritime transport chain choice.   
2.4. Game Theory Application in Transportation 
For more general transportation studies, Adamidou and Kornhauser (1993) formulated an 
N-person non-cooperative game to solve a railroad freight car management problem. Hong and 
Harker (1992) used a Nash Equilibrium model to develop proper pricing of landing slots with 
given demand and airport capacity. Variational Inequality formulation is used to solve the 
oligopolistic air transport market model. Castelli et al. (2004) considered a strategic game 
between two players on the same road transportation network, and introduced a bi-level linear 
programming formulation for the problem. The first player aims at minimizing transportation 
costs, whereas the second player aims at maximizing profit. A bi-level model was also used by 
Moreno-Quintero, Fowkes, and Watling (2013), who analyzed the interactions between the road 
freight carrier and the road planning authority. Shiao and Hwang (2013) analyzed the 
competitive strategies of air cargo carriers in the Asian markets through a two-stage, Nash best-
response game.  
Wang (2002) studied the shipper and carrier relationship using a bi-level program, where 
at the first level, oligopolistic carriers make pricing and routing decisions; and at the second level, 
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the shippers make production and consumption decisions based on spatial price equilibrium 
principle. Based on whether the oligopolistic carriers collude or compete with each other, the 
first-level problem is formulated as either an optimization problem or a Variational Inequality 
problem. A sensitivity analysis-based heuristic algorithm is proposed to solve the program. The 
author did not consider the different cooperative schemes between the carriers and shippers, or 
among the shippers themselves.  
Xiao and Yang (2007) investigated the competitive equilibrium in an oligopolistic freight 
market with shippers, carriers, and infrastructure companies (IC). All three kinds of players act 
as profit maximizing agents, except that the carriers and ICs are assumed to behave 
cooperatively in their own coalitions. A three-stage game model is built. First, the ICs decide on 
a tariff to the carriers, according to their own cost function and the information they have about 
the shipper and the carriers. Then the carriers determine another tariff to the shipper, according 
to their own cost function, the tariff given by the ICs, and the information they have about the 
shipper. Finally, the shipper decides the quantity of the production to maximize its own profit. 
They modeled this hierarchy decision-making process as a strengthening of the Nash equilibrium 
known as sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. Their results showed Nash Equilibrium flows will 
also be system optimum, if nonlinear tariff schedules are applied by both the carriers and 
infrastructure companies. The division of the surplus associated with each shipment is obtained 
by solving a linear programming problem.  
Cooperative game theory approach is used much more commonly on horizontal 
coordination. Cost savings and profit sharing are both common goals of those studies. Some of 
them compared different allocation approaches. Some proposed new cost or profit allocation 
methods. 
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Krajewska et al. (2008) use the Shapley value for sharing the cost savings when freight 
carriers cooperate to balance their request portfolios, reduce the number of empty truck 
movements, and achieve substantial cost reductions. The carriers faced the problem of optimally 
serving a set of pickup and delivery requests with time windows (PDPTW). They also checked 
the non-emptiness of the core and eventually whether the Shapley value belongs to the core.  
Frisk et al. (2010) studied a collaborative forest transportation planning problem for eight 
forest companies in southern Sweden and investigated a number of sharing mechanisms based on 
economic models, including Shapley value, the nucleolus, methods from Tijs and Driessen (1986) 
(ECM, ACAM, CGM), and methods based on shadow prices and volume weights. They also 
proposed a new allocation method, Equal Profit Method (EPM), which is stable in the way that 
the maximum difference in relative savings between all pairs of two players is minimized (the 
participants’ relative profits are as equal as possible.) 
Audy, D’Amours, and Rousseau (2011) presented a collaborative transportation case for 
shippers in the furniture industry and proposed two modifications to the Frisk et al. (2010) EPM 
method, as well as a modified Alternative Cost-Avoided Allocation Method (ACAM) presented 
in Tijs and Driessen (1986), to better reflect the furniture industry’s business context. The 
ACAM method was used to allocate the additional cost incurred by special planning 
requirements of different companies. 
Liu, Wu, and Xu (2010) examined carrier alliances with backhauling and lane exchanges 
to reduce costs and increase profitability. They used different cooperative game solutions, such 
as the Shapley value and the nucleolus, and also proposed a new cost savings allocation method 
called Weighted Relative Savings Model (WRSM), which minimizes the maximum difference 
between weighted relative savings among participants. 
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Sherali and Lunday (2011) found some deficiencies in the present allocation scheme for 
apportioning a railcar fleet to car manufacturers. Four alternative schemes to apportion railcars to 
shippers were analyzed; and two railroad allocation schemes were proposed. Of the eight 
alternatives, the authors found the combination of methods based on Shapley value was 
appealing because of approach uniformity.  
Cruijssen et al. (2010) proposed a new procedure of supplier-initiated outsourcing (called 
insinking), and used the Shapley Monotonic Path of customized tariffs to allocate synergies 
among shippers in a fair and sustainable way. These customized prices were based on each 
shipper’s actual contribution to the total synergy and accomplished a fair allocation of the 
monetary savings resulting from the cooperation. The procedure used an operations research 
algorithm to calculate the value of every possible shipper’s coalition, and used a game theoretical 
solution concept to construct the customized tariffs. The authors found that the insinking is not 
only a viable alternative of traditional shipper outsourcing approach, but also has certain 
advantages. 
Lozano et al. (2013) presented a linear model and used it to study the cost savings that 
different companies may achieve when they merge their transportation requirements. Because 
the core is very large in their case study, they tested another four methods: the Shapley value, the 
Minmax core, the Least core (LC), and the τ-value. It showed all methods give similar (stable 
and fair) solutions, but LC and Minmax core are preferred because of their relative simplicity 
and their seeking fairness. Chen and Yin (2010) found that for a group buying game with a linear 
quantity discount schedule, the uniform allocation resulted in the same cost allocation solution 
from the Shapley value. They concluded that simple allocations, such as the uniform allocation, 
will violate the Shapley axioms for some games but still coincide with the Shapley value in 
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specific games. Considering the main drawback of the Shapley value—the complexity of its 
computation, especially in the voting game whose Shapley value computation is #p-complete—
Fatima, Wooldridge, and Jennings (2008) developed a new linear approximation algorithm based 
on randomization to overcome the complexity of computing the Shapley value for voting games. 
Their method has linear time-complexity with the number of players, but has an approximation 
error that is, on average, lower than a multi-linear extension method. 
2.5. Application of Cooperative Game Theory to Supply Chain Management 
Many cooperative actions, such as collaborative planning, capacity sharing, and 
information sharing, are popular in supply chain management. The importance of supply chain 
coordination and benefits has motivated more studies on supply chain cooperation and 
competition problems and applications of game theory to this field in recent years (Cachon and 
Netessine 2004, Arshinder, Kanda, and Deshmukh 2008).   
Most studies on supply chain cooperation focused on cooperation between players in the 
same echelon. Nagarajan and Sosic (2008) did a survey on application of cooperative game 
theory to supply chain management. Among the 80 papers they reviewed, most are studies on 
cooperation in the same echelon. For this study, several papers on multi-echelon collaboration in 
supply chain management are found and introduced as follows. 
Bartholdi and Kemahlioglu-Ziya (2004) considered the inventory-pooling coalitions of 
two retailers and one common supplier, whereas the supplier bears all the inventory risk. They 
found the Shapley value allocations may be perceived as unfair in that the retailers’ allocations 
can exceed their contribution to supply chain profit in some situations.  
Huang, Huang, and Newman (2011) considered the coordination of suppliers and 
components selection, pricing, and replenishment decisions in a multilevel supply chain 
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composed of multiple suppliers, one single manufacturer, and multiple retailers. This 
coordination problem was modeled as a three-level dynamic non-cooperative game model. 
Analytical and computational methods were developed to determine the Nash equilibrium of the 
game.  
Özener and Ergun (2008) proposed several cost-allocation schemes based on cooperative 
game concepts, such as efficiency, stability, and cross monotonicity. They also defined several 
new properties for their problem. The allocation schemes were applied to a logistics network in 
which shippers collaborate and bundle their shipment requests to negotiate better rates with a 
common carrier.  
Rosenthal (2008) studied the cooperation within one vertically integrated supply chain 
that has three divisions. The goal was to find the best way of allocating costs and profits among 
the divisions for a multi-echelon organization. The authors found the Shapley value generates a 
fair solution only in the perfect information case. Therefore, they used a linear program to obtain 
cooperation solutions for the asymmetric information case. When the divisions in the supply 
chain add value to the product and do not create technological or transactional inefficiencies, the 
author showed that the game is convex, meaning that the core is always nonempty and that the 
Shapley value allocation always lies in the core. But for the integrated supply chain in the 
vertical organization, the characteristic function will not necessarily be a superadditive profit 
function or subadditive cost function, since inefficiencies may occur due to forced cross-
divisional cooperation.  
Some other studies include: Zheng et al. (2011), which modifies the Shapley value 
method to solve the allocation problem of the closed-loop supply chain that includes one 
manufacturer, one distributor, and one independent recycler; Wang, Guo, and Efstathiou (2004), 
26 
 
which analyzed non-cooperative behavior in a one-supplier-N-retailer supply chain; and Zhao et 
al. (2010), which took the cooperative game approach to consider option contracts as a 
coordination solution between manufacturers and retailers.  
Other than transportation and supply chain management, game theory applications 
include fields like emission reduction problems (Filar and Gaertner 1997, Bahn et al. 1998, 
Petrosjan and Zaccour 2003), the automotive industry (Cachon and Lariviere 1999, 2005), retail 
(Sayman, Hoch, and Raju 2002), telecommunications (Nouweland et al. 1996, Anandalingam 
and Nam 1997),  aviation (Adler 2001), and health care (Ford, Wells, and Bailey 2004).  
2.6. Conclusions of Literature Review 
Based on the literature review, it is evident that more applications of game theory have 
emerged in the transportation and supply chain analysis. But most of them used Nash 
Equilibrium to capture the impact of competing relationships on the economic equilibrium. Some 
of those also used multilevel programming programs to examine the hierarchy relationships. 
Very rarely were the cooperative approaches utilized. When cooperative games are concerned, 
very few papers are found using advanced solution concepts, such as the Shapley Value and the 
core, especially for vertical cooperation. Most analyses of transportation cooperation focused on 
one type of stakeholders, e.g., shippers or carriers. Vertical collaboration in supply chain studies 
exists but is limited to the simplest cases. 
Among a limited number of studies that did encounter different echelons’ interactions, 
Lee et al. (2012) utilized the Variational Inequality method to get the Nash Equilibrium solution 
for a non-cooperative model with three types of players in the ocean shipping market. Lin and 
Hsieh (2012) also used a cooperative game approach to study a three-echelon supply chain 
coalitional game, whereas inter-chain competition and intra-chain cooperation are both examined. 
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Asgari, Farahani, and Goh (2013) analyzed three types of interactions between a shipping 
company and two hub ports, but did not use any game theory solutions. Rosenthal (2008) study 
used Shapley value and cooperation theory to analyze cooperation among players at different 
levels of one vertically integrated supply chain. 
There are at least two reasons for this lack of research applying cooperative game theory 
approach to freight shipment distribution. First, Nash Equilibrium and Wardrop Principles have 
been well developed and extensively used. Therefore, most research on transportation spatial 
distribution problems tend to use the most traditional methods, which have been relatively 
successful and widely accepted. Second, as discussed the first chapter, the structure of a 
shipment chain resembles the one of a supply chain, with different levels of players. The intra-
chain cooperation and inter-chain competion characters make the problems difficult to model. So 
far, as much review has been done, although many studies have noted the necessity of 
considering player interactions in supply chain management problems, analytical analysis of 
multi-echelon players’ cooperation is very limited, or only include a very small number of 
players. For a shipment distribution analysis, typically a large number of nodes, arcs and players 
are involved. It is a challenge to model such a complex system using a cooperative game theory 
approach.  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Preliminaries of Cooperative Game Theory 
“Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and 
cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers. Game theory provides general 
mathematical techniques for analyzing situations in which two or more individuals make 
decisions that will influence one another’s welfare” (Myerson 1991). It deals with interactive 
optimization problems (Cachon and Netessine 2004). John von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern established and summarized the basics of game theory, and have been credited as 
the fathers of modern game theory. The subject of cooperative games also first appeared in their 
seminal work (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944). However, for a long time, cooperative 
game theory (CGT) did not enjoy as much attention as non-cooperative game theory. Papers 
employing CGT to study supply chain management and transportation problems had been scarce, 
although becoming more popular (Cachon and Netessine 2004). This chapter’s purpose is to give 
a brief introduction to CGT and a summary of those concepts that are most relevant to this 
dissertation.  
3.1.1. Introduction of CGT 
Though different in theoretical content and the methodology used, the cooperative and 
the non-cooperative approach are looking at the same problem. To quote the words of Aumann 
(1959), “the game is one ideal and the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches are two 
shadows.” In a non-cooperative game, each player selects a strategy that maximizes its payoff, 
assuming others’ strategies could be expected and defensive strategies are applied by everyone. 
CGT involves a major shift in paradigms compared with non-cooperative game theory: while the 
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latter is more concerned with the specific actions of the players, the former focuses on the 
outcome of the game instead of individual actions (Cachon and Netessine 2004). The CGT 
assumes that the players negotiate before the game is played and make a “binding” agreement. 
Once a coalition is formed, the players of the coalition act as one player with a jointly agreed set 
of strategies to maximize the sum of payoffs to the coalition (Thomas 1986). After this comes 
the problem of sharing the rewards among members of the coalition. Each individual would join 
the coalition that offers the greatest reward. So another assumption about cooperative games is 
that the players can transfer their gains between each other via “side payment” without any 
transaction losses.  
Two distinctive approaches are used to examine solutions in cooperative games. The first 
solution concept is based on the domination of one set of outcomes, characterized by payoff 
vectors, over others. The dominant set is supposed to be in the “core.” Another way of obtaining 
solutions for cooperative games is to consider values, including the Shapley value, which 
provides a unique outcome for a cooperative game. The core and the Shapley value are only two 
of the many solution concepts for coalition games with transferable utility, but also the most 
classic ones. Almost all cooperative game solutions use the characteristic function to select a 
subset of imputations that satisfy the requirements embodied in the solution concept adopted. An 
imputation is a vector whose entries correspond to players’ payoffs. The definitions of 
characteristic function and imputation are introduced first.  
Definition 1: A characteristic function of an n-person game assigns each subset S of the 
players the maximum value of v(S) that coalition S can guarantee itself by coordinating the 
strategies of its members, no matter what the other players do. (Thomas 1986) 
30 
 
The coalition value v(S) could also be called the worth of coalition S. Note by definition 
the value of a coalition is independent of the coalitions and actions taken by the non-coalition 
members.  
Definition 2: An imputation in an n-person game with characteristic function v is a 
vector 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) satisfying 
1) ∑ 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑣(𝑁)𝑛𝑖=1 ;  (3.1) 
2) 𝑥𝑖  ≥ 𝑣(𝑖),𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑛 (Thomas 1986). (3.2)  
 The first condition (Efficiency Condition) requires that total repay to all the players in the 
game should equal to the grand coalition’s value, and is a Pareto optimality condition. The 
second condition (Individual Rationality Condition) means that everyone must not get less than 
he could get if he played by himself. 
3.1.2. The Core 
Gillies (1959) defined the core based on the idea that a good imputation should not be 
dominated by any other imputations; otherwise it is not stable. The definitions of domination and 
the core are introduced below.  
Definition 3: Let x and y be two imputations. Imputation x dominates y over coalition S 
(𝑥 >𝑠 𝑦) if 
1) 𝑥𝑖 > 𝑦𝑖 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 ∈ 𝑆; (3.3) 
2) ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 ≤ 𝑣(𝑆) (Thomas 1986). (3.4) 
Definition 4: The core of a game v, denoted by C(v), is the set of imputations that are not 
dominated for any coalition (Thomas 1986). 
Theorem 1:  Imputation x is in the core if and only if 
1) ∑ 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑣(𝑁),𝑛𝑖=1   (3.5) 
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2) ∑ 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑣(𝑆),𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑆 ∈ 𝑁𝑛𝑖∈𝑆  (Thomas 1986). (3.6) 
This theorem tells that “a utility vector is in the core if the total utility of every possible 
coalition is at least as large as the coalition’s value, i.e., there does not exist a coalition of players 
that could make all of its members at least as well off and one member strictly better off” 
(Cachon and Netessine 2004). Thus, if a feasible allocation x is not in the core, there is a 
coalition S such that the players in S could all do strictly better than in x by cooperating together 
and dividing the worth v(S) among themselves. 
There have been some applications of core theory in the shipping industry in the past 
(Sjostrom 1989, 1993, Pirrong 1992, Yang, Liu, and Shi 2011). Sjostrom (1989, 1993) indicates 
that the reason for collusion in the liner market is to impose equilibrium where non-empty core 
exists. He proves that empty core is more likely to appear in liner shipping markets where 
carriers’ minimum average costs demonstrate limited variability, demand is less elastic, and the 
excess capacity exists. He also recognizes that inefficient entry is the main cause for an empty 
core to occur in the liner shipping market.  
Although the core restricts the amount of allocations that are stable and reasonable, it 
does not give a definite solution (there are often many imputations in the core.) It is also very 
often that the core is empty, which indicates that the grand coalition is not stable, i.e., some 
players may break out and start their own coalition. Thus another approach of solving the 
cooperative game is a unique expected payoff allocation for the players. 
3.1.3. The Shapley Value 
Lloyds S. Shapley put forth three axioms which he believed each player’s payoff in a 
superadditive game should satisfy, and he proved there is only one function that will satisfy all of 
them (Shapley 1953). The three properties are: 1) Symmetry: Only the role of a player in the 
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game should matter, not the player’s specific names or label in the set N; 2) Dummy/efficiency: 
Only players that “add value” will receive positive allocations and they should divide the grand 
coalition’s value among themselves, allocating nothing to the dummies; 3) Additivity: the 
Shapley value added from two separate games is equal to the value from the sum of the two 
games. The superadditive game is defined as below.  
Definition 5: A characteristic function v is said to be superadditive if and only if, for 
every pair of coalitions S and T,  
𝑖𝑓 𝑆 ∩ 𝑇 = ∅ 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑣(𝑆 ∪ 𝑇) ≥ 𝑣(𝑆) + 𝑣(𝑇).  (3.7) 
The function ∅𝑖(𝑣) that satisfies all the three axioms is the Shapley value payoff to the ith 
player. The formula is given as Equation 3.8. 
∅𝑖(𝑣) = ∑ �𝑣(𝐾) − 𝑣(𝐾\{𝑖})� (𝑘−1)!(𝑛−𝑘)!𝑛!𝐾  (3.8)  
 The formula could be interpreted as follows. The players are assumed to arrive at the 
game in a random order. There are totally n players. When player i arrives, he gets the extra 
amount value (revenue increase or cost saving or both) he brings to the game, which is v(K) – 
v(K\{i}) assuming there are K-1 players ahead of him. The probability that player i arrives after 
any K-1 players and before any other n-S players could be calculated as (𝑘 − 1)! (𝑛 − 𝑘)! 𝑛!⁄ . So 
the Shapley value for a player is essentially the weighted average of the contributions the player 
makes to all possible coalitions, while the weight depends on the number of players n and the 
number of members in each coalition (Myerson 1991). If the game v is superadditive, then the 
Shapley value must be individually rational, in the sense that ϕ𝑖(𝑣) ≥ 𝑣({𝑖}),∀𝑖 ∈ 𝑁.   
Although the Shapley value’s formulation depends on the function v being superadditive, 
Aumann and Shapley (1974) showed a small technical modification will generalize the Shapley 
value to nonsuperadditive games. For games that are not superadditive, one can replace the 
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“additivity” condition (3) with the following “linearity” condition: that a reasonable allocation 
should give a player in a convex combination of games the convex combination of the 
allocations from the separate games. When taken along with axioms (1) and (2), linearity 
amounts to the same thing as additivity.  
Definition 6. In general, let (N,v) be a superadditive game for which v(S) is nonnegative 
for all 𝑆,𝑇 ⊆ 𝑁, with 𝑣(∅) = 0, (N,v) is a convex game if 
 𝑣(𝑆 ∪ 𝑇) + 𝑣(𝑆 ∩ 𝑇) ≥ 𝑣(𝑆) + 𝑣(𝑇),∀ 𝑆,𝑇 ⊆ 𝑁   (3.9) 
Shapley (1971) showed that if (N,v) is convex, then (2) is equivalent to the condition 
known as the “increment property,” namely, 
𝑣(𝑆 ∪ {𝑖}) − 𝑣(𝑆) ≤ 𝑣(𝑇 ∪ {𝑖}) − 𝑣(𝑇),∀ 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑆 ⊆ 𝑇 ⊆ 𝑁{𝑖}  (3.10) 
This property represents a “bandwagon” effect in which all players contribute a non-
decreasing marginal profit as the coalitions they join increase in size. Shapley (1971) showed 
that the core of a convex game is always nonempty and the Shapley value of the game is the 
centroid of the core.  
In comparison to the core, the Shapley value has attracting properties of being unique and 
fair, and it always exists. But by itself there is no guarantee that it is stable, e.g., it may not be 
part of the core. So far, the Shapley value is considered a superior solution to dynamic coalitions, 
and has been a powerful tool for evaluating the power structure in a coalitional game. It is 
probably the most commonly used solution method in the literature. But due to its computation 
complexity and that it may not be stable, many other approaches have been proposed to modify it 
or approximate its results.  
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3.1.4. Least Core and Minmax Core 
Two of the methods that have been proposed to handle two limitations of core solution—
it is not unique and it may be empty—are Least core (LC) (Drechsel and Kimms 2010) and 
Minmax core (MMC) (Drechsel and Kimms 2011) . 
The strong ε-core was introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1966) as 
𝐶ℰ(𝑐) = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑅𝑛 : ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 = 𝑣(𝑁) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 ≥ 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝜀  ∀𝑆 ≠ ∅, 𝑆 ⊂ 𝑁}  (3.11) 
Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley (1979) defined LC as being the strong ε-core with smallest 
possible 𝜀 ∈ ℛ such that 𝐶ℰ(𝑐) is not empty. Hence, they described the LC as centrally located 
within the core, if the core is not empty; and as a means to reveal the position in the “latent” core, 
if the core is empty.  
The formulation of the Least core (LC) method is shown as follows.  min 𝜀   (3.12) 
Subject to 
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 = 𝑣(𝑁)  (3.13) 
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 ≥ 𝑣(𝑆) − 𝜀   (3.14) 
A value of 𝜀 ≤ 0 indicates the core is not empty.  
Analogously, the η-core of a game and the corresponding Minmax core (Drechsel and 
Kimms 2011)  can be defined respectively as 
𝐶𝜂(𝑐) = {𝑦 ∈ 𝑅𝑛 : ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 = 𝑣(𝑁) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 ≥ 𝜂𝑣(𝑆)  ∀𝑆 ≠ ∅, 𝑆 ⊂ 𝑁}; (3.15)  
𝜂0 = max�𝜂: 𝐶𝜂(𝐶𝑆) ≠ ∅�.  (3.16) 
The formulation of the Minmax core (MMC) method is shown as follows.  
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝜂  (3.17) 
Subject to  
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∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 = 𝑣(𝑁)  (3.18) 
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑖∈𝑆 ≥ 𝜂𝑣(𝑆)  (3.19) 
A value of η ≥ 1 indicates that the core is not empty.  
3.2. Stackelberg Game and Bi-Level Programming Problem  
3.2.1. Stackelberg Game and Hierarchy Decision Making by BLPP 
Stackelberg (1934) introduced a dynamic game called the Stackelberg game. In this game, 
one player acts as the leader and chooses a strategy first. The follower observes this decision and 
makes its strategy choice after the leader. The leader-follower model has been used in literature 
to model the hierarchy relationship between policy makers and transportation practitioners, or 
between infrastructure planners and users. It also appeared multiple times in studies to model 
shipping companies as the dominant decision maker and the leader in the container shipping 
industry while other players are considered as followers (Lee et al. 2012, Talley and Ng 2013, 
Asgari, Farahani, and Goh 2013, Xiao and Yang 2007, Wang 2002). 
The leader-follower game is a typical hierarchy decision-making problem, which is most 
properly represented by a special type of mathematical programming: bi-level or multilevel 
programming models. A bi-level math programming is one that the constraint region contains 
another optimization problem. A three-level problem results when the second level problem is 
another bi-level problem itself. Multilevel problems could be further defined by extending this 
idea. 
To define the problem, suppose there are n optimizers, each of which wishes to maximize 
its objective function 𝑓𝑖. Each optimizer has control over a set of decision variables 𝑋𝑖 ⊆ 𝑅𝑛. 
Optimizer 1 to i makes choices in a sequential order. The whole problem could be represented in 
the following format: 
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max 𝑓1(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛 ),𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥1𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑠   (3.20) 
𝑥1 ∈ 𝑋1  (3.21) 
𝑔1(𝑥1) ≥ 0  (3.22) max 𝑓2(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛 ),𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥2𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑠   (3.23) 
𝑥2 ∈ 𝑋2   (3.24) 
𝑔2(𝑥1, 𝑥2) ≥ 0 (3.25) …  max 𝑓𝑛(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛 ),𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑥𝑛𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑠  (3.26) 
𝑥𝑛 ∈ 𝑋𝑛  (3.27) 
𝑔𝑛(𝑥1, 𝑥2) ≥ 0  (3.28) 
If n =1, the problem becomes a standard optimization problem. If n = 2, this is a bi-level 
problem. Fortuny-Amat and McCarl (1981) pointed out that although most managerial decisions 
are of a bi-level or multilevel nature, many problems are not studied in the multilevel framework 
when they should have. Instead, either multi-objective programming or a procedure that ignores 
the sub-problem objective was used. In the case of multi-objective programming, the objectives 
are weighted and optimized simultaneously, which introduces irrational economic behavior and, 
in fact, models the wrong problem. On the other hand, ignoring the sub-problem’s objective will 
also introduce large errors in the master optimal objective.  
3.2.2. Solution of BLPP 
Bi-level programs were initially called mathematical programs with optimization 
problems in the constraints by Bracken and McGill in a series of papers (Bracken and McGill 
1973, 1974, 1978). The term bi-level and multilevel programming were first used by Candler and 
Norton (1977). The first bibliographical survey on the subject was written by Kolstad (1985). 
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Surveys presenting both theoretical results and solution approaches include Vicente and Calamai 
(1994) and Colson, Marcotte, and Savard (2007).  
Being generically non-convex and non-differentiable, bi-level programs are intrinsically 
hard. Even the “simplest” instance, the linear-linear BLPP, was shown to be strongly NP-hard 
(Hansen, Jaumard, and Savard 1992, Vicente, Savard, and Júdice 1996). Thus, it is not surprising 
that algorithmic research to date has focused on the simplest cases of bi-level programs, such as 
those with linear, quadratic, or convex objective and constraint functions. In fact, the most 
studied bi-level programming problems have been for a long time the linear BLPP (Colson, 
Marcotte, and Savard 2007). 
One type of algorithm for BLPP is the extreme point search method, which focuses on 
linear bi-level problems. A linear bi-level problem with a finite optimal solution contains at least 
one vertex of the constraint region where an optimal (global) solution is attained (Shi, Lu, and 
Zhang 2005). Another type of algorithm for bi-level programming problems when the lower 
level problem is convex and regular utilized Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions to transform the 
problem into a single-level problem. For a standard maximization model below, the Lagrangian 
function combines all constraints and the objective function. The necessary conditions for this 
function’s minimum are the same as those for the constrained original problem. For a model 
defined by Equation 3.29 to 3.31, the Lagrangian function of it is shown by Equation 3.32. And 
by taking the first derivatives of the Lagrangian function, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KT) 
conditions of the model are obtained as Equations 3.33 to 3.38. max 𝑓(𝑥)  (3.29) 
Subject to 
𝑔𝑖(𝑋) ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑚 (3.30) 
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ℎ𝑖(𝑋) = 0, 𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑝  (3.31) 
𝐿(𝑥,𝑢, 𝑣, 𝑠) = 𝑓(𝑥) + ∑ 𝑢𝑖[𝑔𝑖(𝑥) − 𝑠𝑖2]𝑚𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝑣𝑖ℎ𝑖(𝑥)𝑝𝑖=1  (3.32) 
𝛻𝑓(𝑥∗) + ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝛻𝑔𝑖(𝑥∗)𝑖∈𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + ∑ 𝑣𝑖𝛻ℎ𝑖(𝑥∗)𝑝𝑖=1 = 0 (3.33) 
𝑔𝑖(𝑥∗) − 𝑠𝑖2 = 0, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑚  (3.34) 
ℎ𝑖(𝑥∗) = 0, 𝑖 = 1, 2, … ,𝑝   (3.35) 
𝑢𝑖𝑔𝑖(𝑥∗) = 0, 𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑚  (3.36) 
𝑠𝑖
2 ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑚  (3.37) 
𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,2, …𝑚  (3.38) 
After KKT transformation, the problem becomes a single-level programming problem, 
but contains a set of nonlinear complementary slackness constraints, which are intrinsically 
combinatorial. When the first-level problem is convex, the new problem is best addressed by 
enumeration algorithms, such as branch-and-bound (BB). Algorithms based on this idea were 
proposed by Bard and Falk (1982) for solving linear bi-level programming problems. The 
approach was adapted by Bard and Moore (1990) to linear-quadratic problems and byAl-Khayal, 
Horst, and Pardalos (1992), Edmunds and Bard (1991), Bard (1988),  and Fortuny-Amat and 
McCarl (1981) to the quadratic-quadratic case. Edmunds and Bard (1992) further extended the 
approach to an integer linear-quadratic BPP. 
Both Bard and Falk (1982) and Fortuny-Amat and McCarl (1981) focused on 
transforming the new single-level problem to a more manageable form. More specifically, Bard 
and Falk (1982) provided a separable representation of the nonlinear complementary slackness 
constraints. The new problem is still non-convex, but all functions are separable and a BB 
technique was applied to find global solutions. Fortuny-Amat and McCarl (1981) introduced new 
binary variables and large positive numbers to linearize the complementary slackness constraints. 
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The new problem is a mixed integer quadratic problem. For a fixed binary variable, the new 
problem is convex and can be readily solved for a global optimum. A BB technique is used to 
enumerate the possibilities for the binary variable and solve the new problem at each iteration. 
Bard and Moore (1990) followed Fortuny-Amat and McCarl’s method of suppressing the 
complementary slackness constraints first, and solved the resulting sub-problem. A check is 
made at each iteration to check if the complementary constraints are satisfied. If so, the 
corresponding point is feasible. If not, a branch and bound scheme is used to implicitly examine 
all possible combinations of complementary slackness. Segall (1990) used this method to solve a 
bi-level geometric programming problem. Bianco, Caramia, and Giordani (2009) used Fortuny-
Amat and McCarl’s method and solved a mixed integer linear problem after applying KKT 
conditions on a hazmat transportation network design problem.   
There are also authors using commercial optimization solvers or heuristic algorithm to 
solve a linear bi-level problem (Bianco, Caramia, and Giordani 2009). For more complicated 
multilevel models with non-convex objective functions, global solution algorithms have to be 
applied in order to guarantee the global optimal solution. Sinha and Sinha (2002) applied the 
KKT condition twice to transfer a three-level programming problem to single level. The resulting 
problem is highly non-convex and nonlinear. They only found a local optimal solution using 
standard techniques. Wang (2002) designed a sensitivity analysis-based heuristic algorithm to 
solve a bi-level problem. Asgari, Farahani, and Goh (2013) used an interval branch and bound 
(IBB) to solve their non-convex nonlinear integer programming model for a bi-level model with 
one shipping company and two relay hub ports.  
Finally, as pointed out by Bard and Falk (1982), a bi-level programming problem may 
not possess a solution when a certain player is indifferent among a number of solution points. If 
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faced with multiple choices, there is no guarantee that the second-level player will select the 
value that also optimizes the first-level player’s objective function. This unstable optimal 
solution of bi-level programming models is also illustrated by Bianco, Caramia, and Giordani 
(2009).   
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4. MODEL CONSTRUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the container shipment chain has many characteristics that are 
similar to a supply chain. In a supply chain, an echelon stands for the group of players at the 
same level of the chain. As the containers are transported from the shippers at the origin to the 
consignees at the destination, they pass three main segments: the ocean shipment part, ocean to 
land transfer, and the land shipment part. Starting from the export ports overseas, the 
transportation operators involved include shipping companies as the ocean carrier, terminal 
operators as the transfer point from ocean to land, and railway or trucking companies as the 
inland carriers to the final destinations. The three segments are the three levels/echelons along 
the shipment chain, and there is usually more than one player at one echelon. When the Panama 
Canal is used, the canal operator is an additional level in the shipment chain. Generally, 
competition and cooperation exist both within and between echelons. Each player has its own 
economic objective (maximizing profit) and a set of control variables.  
Fan’s (2008) model was targeted at minimizing the ocean carrier’s total cost, which 
consists of vessel operating costs, railway charges, and Panama Canal charges. Jula and 
Leachman (2011a, b) minimized the shippers’ total cost, which includes the total transportation 
cost and inventory cost. Both formulation types used single objective functions and incorporated 
the charges by other transportation operators (rail, terminal, canal, etc.) as fixed values, 
indicating that the authors did not consider interactions among the players. In reality, each player 
in the shipment chain tries to maximize individual gains by choosing an optimal strategy and 
responding to other players’ strategies. Players may form coalitions or compete with others. 
Coalition members may stay in their coalition or decide to defect to another one that makes a 
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higher tender offer. The dynamic decision-making process continues until a stable equilibrium is 
reached where no player may unilaterally defect to another coalition and earn a higher profit.  
In this study, the interactions between transportation operators in the U.S. containerized-
import transportation industry are analyzed using cooperative game theory (CGT). Section 4.1 
explains how the coalition values are derived from the bi-level mathematical models and 
describes the structure of bi-level models for different cooperating schemes. Section 4.2 lists the 
basic components of the models, illustrates two examples for model construction, and describes 
the KKT transformation of the second example.  
4.1. Bi-Level Model Formulations and Cooperation Schemes  
In the global container-shipping market, the transportation operators may form various 
coalitions. CGT is not concerned with the detailed negotiation process and cooperation 
approaches, but focuses on predicting the negotiation results, including what type of coalition 
will form, how its members divide coalition gains, and whether the coalition is stable.  
As presented in Chapter 3 (Methodology), all the existing CGT solutions utilize the 
characteristic functions that calculate the coalition values. In order to find a solution for the 
multi-player container-shipping game, a special design is made to calculate all the possible 
coalition values using bi-level models. The characteristic function for coalition S in an n-person 
game is defined as the maximum value that coalition S could guarantee its members by 
coordinating the strategies of its members, no matter what the other players outside the coalition 
do. Assuming that defensive strategies are applied, the players outside coalition S will form a 
coalition and cooperate to maximize their coalition’s value. In that way, the market will consist 
of two complementary coalitions that compete with each other. When the container-shipping 
market is characterized by a leader-follower relationship between the OC and the other players, 
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bi-level optimization models are used. The first-level objective function is maximizing the 
leading coalition’s total profit while the second-level objective function is maximizing the 
following coalition’s total profit. Thus, one bi-level model could be solved to obtain one pair of 
coalition values. 
With n players in the game, the total number of possible coalitions is 2n, and the total 
number of bi-level models needed is 2n-1. When different cooperating schemes are applied, the 
mathematical formulation also varies, but the mathematical models all follow the same structure 
and are composed of the same basic model components. Therefore, instead of presenting every 
model thoroughly (it is also impossible without noting who the players are in the market), a list 
of basic notations and functions as well as two examples are presented in the next section. The 
complete model structure and the model list for a specific case study are given in Chapter 5.  
4.2. Basic Model Components 
For an ocean carrier to ship containers from I origins through J import terminals to K 
inland destinations, the OC’s problem is to find the optimal vessel arrangement and geographic 
paths so that its profit is maximized, assuming the OC’s charging rate and demand are both fixed. 
The OC’s total cost comprises vessel operating costs as well as charges paid to terminal 
operators, inland carriers, and the Panama Canal operator if the canal is used. Depending on the 
distance between the port and the destination, the land carrier could be either a truck company or 
a railroad carrier. Assuming that those OC service providers could not invest in their 
infrastructure or greatly improve their service quality in the short term, their only controlled 
variables are the charging rates. Some of the basic notations and functions are listed in the sub-
sections.  
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4.2.1. Notation Set 
Indices 
𝑖:  Import origins 𝑖 = 1, 2, … 𝐼 
𝑗: Container terminals 𝑗 = 1, 2, … 𝐽 
𝑘:  Import destinations 𝑘 = 1, 2, …𝐾 
𝑠: Vessel size 𝑠 = 1, 2, … 𝑆 
List of Players 
𝑂𝐶: Ocean carrier 
𝑃𝑗: Terminal operator 𝑗 = 1, 2, … 𝐽 
𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑘:  Inland carrier 𝑗 = 1, 2, … 𝐽;  𝑘 = 1, 2, …𝐾  
𝑃𝐶: Panama Canal operator 
Parameters 
𝑆𝑍𝑠:   Carrying capacity of vessel size s in Forty-foot Equivalent Unit (FEU) 
𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑆: Daily vessel cost at sea for vessel size s (dollars) 
𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑃𝑆: Daily vessel cost at port for size s (dollars) 
𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑗
𝑠 :   Average transit time at sea for route i-j for vessel size s (days) 
𝑇𝑃𝑗
𝑠:   Average time at terminal j for vessel size s (days) 
𝑇𝐿𝑗𝑘:   Average transit time inland for route j-k per FEU (days) 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑗:   Annual handling capacity of terminal j (FEU) 
𝐷𝑀𝐷𝑘: Demand of import destination k (FEU) 
𝑅𝑖𝑘:   OC charging rate per FEU for O-D pair i-k (dollars/FEU) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿𝑗:  Lower bound of charging rate by terminal j (dollars/FEU) 
𝑅𝑅𝐿𝑗,𝑘: Lower bound of charging rate by inland carrier j-k (dollars/FEU) 
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𝐶𝑅𝐿:   Lower bound of charging rate by Panama Canal (dollars/FEU) 
𝑃𝑅𝑈𝑗:   Upper bound of charging rate by terminal j (dollars/FEU) 
𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑗,𝑘:  Upper bound of charging rate by inland carrier j-k (dollars/FEU) 
𝐶𝑅𝑈:  Upper bound of charging rate by Panama Canal (dollars/FEU) 
Decision Variables 
𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑠 :  Number of size s vessels on route i-j per year   
𝑣𝑙𝑗,𝑘:   Number of FEU shipments on route j-k per year 
𝑝𝑟𝑗:   Service charge per FEU by terminal j (dollars/FEU) 
𝑟𝑟𝑗,𝑘:   Service charge per FEU by land carrier on route j-k (dollars/FEU) 
𝑐𝑟:  Service charge per FEU by Panama Canal (dollars/FEU) 
4.2.2. List of Functions 
Revenue Function of Terminal 𝑷𝒋 
𝑅𝑃𝑗�𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 � = 𝑝𝑟𝑗 ∗ ∑ �𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑍𝑠�𝑠,𝑖 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽  (4.1) 
Revenue function of Inland Carrier 𝑰𝑪𝒋,𝒌 
𝑅𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑘�𝑟𝑟𝑗,𝑘, 𝑣𝑙𝑗,𝑘� = 𝑟𝑟𝑗,𝑘 ∗ 𝑣𝑙𝑗,𝑘, 𝑗𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐽 ∗ 𝐾  (4.2) 
Revenue function of the Panama Canal 
𝑅𝑝𝑐�𝑐𝑟, 𝑣𝑖𝑗′𝑠 � = 𝑐𝑟 ∗ ∑ �𝑣𝑖𝑗′𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑍𝑠�𝑠,𝑖,𝑗′ , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑗′ 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡 (4.3) 
Revenue function of Ocean Carrier 
𝑅𝑜𝑐 = ∑ 𝐷𝑀𝐷𝑘 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑘𝑖,𝑘   (4.4) 
Cost function of Terminal 𝑷𝒋 
𝐶𝑃𝑗�𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑠 � = 𝑃𝑅𝐿𝑗 ∗ ∑ �𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑍𝑠�𝑠,𝑖 , 𝑗 = 1. . 𝐽  (4.5) 
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Cost function of Inland Carrier 𝑰𝑪𝒋,𝒌 
𝐶𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑘�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 � = 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝑗,𝑘 ∗ 𝑣𝑙𝑗,𝑘, 𝑗𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐽 ∗ 𝐾  (4.6) 
Cost function of the Panama Canal 
𝐶𝑝𝑐�𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑠 � = 𝐶𝑅𝐿 ∗ ∑ �𝑣𝑖𝑗′𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑍𝑠�𝑠,𝑖,𝑗′ , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑗′ 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐸𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑠𝑡 (4.7) 
Operating Cost Function of Ocean Carrier 
𝐶𝑜𝑐�𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑠 � = 𝐶𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑉 + 𝐶𝑆𝑇𝑃𝑉  (4.8) 
1. Total annual vessel cost at sea 
𝐶𝑆𝑇𝑆𝑉 = ∑ �𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑖𝑗𝑠 ∗ 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 �𝑠,𝑖,𝑗   (4.9) 
2. Total annual vessel cost at terminal 
𝐶𝑆𝑇𝑃𝑉 = ∑ �𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑃𝑆 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑠 ∗ 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 �𝑠,𝑖,𝑗   (4.10) 
Profit function of Terminal 𝑷𝒋 
𝑓𝑃𝑗�𝑝𝑟𝑗, 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 � = �𝑝𝑟𝑗 − 𝑃𝑅𝐿𝑗� ∗ ∑ �𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑍𝑠�𝑠,𝑖 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝐽  (4.11) 
Profit function of Inland Carrier 𝑰𝑪𝒋,𝒌 
𝑓𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑘�𝑟𝑟𝑗,𝑘, 𝑣𝑙𝑗,𝑘� = �𝑟𝑟𝑗,𝑘 − 𝑅𝑅𝐿𝑗,𝑘� ∗ 𝑣𝑙𝑗,𝑘, 𝑗𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐽 ∗ 𝐾  (4.12) 
Profit function of the Panama Canal 
𝑓𝑝𝑐�𝑐𝑟, 𝑣𝑖𝑗′𝑠 � = (𝑐𝑟 − 𝐶𝑅𝐿) ∗ ∑ �𝑣𝑖𝑗′𝑠 ∗ 𝑆𝑍𝑠�𝑠,𝑖,𝑗′   (4.13) 
4.3. Illustration of Example Models  
There are numerous possible coalitions with n players in the game, and it is impossible to 
present all of them. For illustration purposes, two examples are given in this section.  
The first one is that, when the grand coalition is formed, all players act as one entity and 
have one common objective function of maximizing the total profit. Payments from the OC to 
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terminal operators and land carriers become “side payments” and are determined by negotiation 
inside the coalition. For the grand coalition, the mathematical model will only have one level, 
and its objective function is as follows:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣 = 𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 �.  (4.14) 
The second example (Model Example 2) assumes that the ocean carrier forms a coalition 
with all the terminal and inland operators, while the Panama Canal is left out as a singleton 
player. Thus, the first-level coalition (the leader coalition) is {𝑂𝐶,𝑃1, …𝑃𝐽, 𝐼𝐶1,1 … 𝐼𝐶𝐽𝐾}. The 
second-level coalition (the follower coalition) is {𝑃𝐶}. Because members in the same coalition 
essentially act as one player against the other coalition, the two coalitions’ values are determined 
by competition between them while the final payment to each individual player is determined by 
negotiation results inside each coalition. For simplification, the constraint set for Model Example 
2 is represented by 𝑔𝑚�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟� and ℎ𝑛�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟�. (Detailed constraints will be explained in 
Chapter 5 for the Case Study.) The coalition value of {𝑂𝐶,𝑃1, …𝑃𝐽 , 𝐼𝐶1,1 … 𝐼𝐶𝐽,𝐾} is the optimal 
value of v1, and the coalition value of {𝑃𝐶} is the optimal value of v2. 
4.3.1. Model Example 2 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣1�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟� = 𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 � − ∑ 𝐶𝑃𝑗�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 �𝑗 − ∑ 𝐶𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑘�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 �𝑗,𝑘 − 𝐶𝑝𝑐�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 � − 𝑓𝑝𝑐(𝑐𝑟) 
 (4.15) 
Subject to 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣2�𝑐𝑟, 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 � = 𝑓𝑝𝑐�𝑐𝑟, 𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 �   (4.16) 
Subject to 
𝑔𝑚�𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟� ≤ 0,𝑚 = 1, …𝑀  (4.17) 
ℎ𝑛�𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟� = 0,𝑛 = 1, …𝑁  (4.18) 
48 
 
4.4. KKT Transformation of the Bi-Level Model 
The Stackelberg game is solved by first applying the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) 
conditions to the second level of the mathematical models so that the bi-level model is converted 
to a single-level model. The new model is non-convex, and the global optimum may not be 
found using local optimum solutions. Using the Model Example 2, the process is illustrated as 
follows. 
4.4.1. Original Model Example Model 2 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣1(𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟) (4.19) 
Subject to 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣2(𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟)  (4.20) 
Subject to 
𝑔𝑚�𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟� ≤ 0, 𝑚 = 1, … ,𝑀  (4.21) 
ℎ𝑛�𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟� = 0, 𝑛 = 1, … ,𝑁 (4.22) 
4.4.2. Transfer the Second level by KKT 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣1�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟� (4.23) 
Subject to 
𝛻𝑐𝑟𝑣2(𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟) + ∑ 𝑢𝑚 ∗ 𝛻𝑐𝑟𝑔𝑚�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟�𝑚∈𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 + ∑ 𝑣𝑛 ∗ 𝛻𝑐𝑟ℎ𝑛�𝑣𝑖𝑗𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟�𝑝𝑛=1 = 0  (4.24) 
𝑔𝑚�𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟� ≤ 0, 𝑚 = 1, … ,𝑀  (4.25) 
ℎ𝑛�𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟� = 0, 𝑛 = 1, … ,𝑁  (4.26) 
𝑢𝑚 ∗ 𝑔𝑚�𝑣𝑖𝑗
𝑠 , 𝑐𝑟� = 0, 𝑚 = 1, … ,𝑀  (4.27) 
𝑢𝑚 ≥ 0, 𝑚 = 1, … ,𝑀  (4.28) 
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5. CASE STUDY 
As shown in the previous chapter, the complexity of the mathematical problem arises 
exponentially with the number of players. This chapter creates a case study with one ocean 
carrier, two terminals, one rail operator, and one Panama Canal operator. Section 5.1 explains 
how the case study is established, presents Model 1 for one coalition type, and shows how Model 
1 is transformed to a single-level model. The list of all 32 coalitions and their according models 
are inserted as Appendix B. Section 5.2 discusses the sources and estimates for parameter values. 
Model results and sensitivity analysis are presented in the next chapter. 
5.1. Coalitions and Models 
The five players in the case study are: one ocean carrier (OC), one terminal operator at 
the Los Angles Port (P1), one terminal operator at the Norfolk Port (P2), one rail operator (R), 
and one Panama Canal operator (PC). The port of Hong Kong is used as the origin, and Norfolk, 
VA, is assumed as the destination. The OC has two route choices: the West Coast route (WCR), 
which involves P1 and the railroad connection (R) from P1 to final destination; and the East 
Coast route (ECR), which bypasses Norfolk Port and the Panama Canal. The destination is 
chosen to be very near P2 so that no additional inland carrier is included for the ECR. Trucking 
service is only used for the final door-delivery for both routes, and therefore, is not considered in 
the game.  
Because the maximum vessel size that could be handled by the Panama Canal currently is 
4,400 TEUs, the vessel operating cost for the ECR is first calculated based on 4,000-TEU vessels’ 
normal operations, while a standard 8,000-TEU vessel is assumed for the WCR. The Panama 
Canal expansion is expected to be accomplished by August 2014, and the new locks will be able 
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to handle vessels up to 13,000 TEU in capacity. By then, it is also expected both ports could 
serve larger vessels like PostPanama container ships. For the case study, instead of using 
variables for the number of different vessels, the variables for the shipment volume in FEU 
(𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗for port j) are used. And the number of vessels calling at terminal j can be represented by 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 𝑆𝑍
𝑠⁄ . Note fractional vessel numbers are accepted for this case study because, in reality, 
only a portion of the containers carried by a vessel are for one destination. 
The total number of coalitions is 32 (25) with five players in the game. To get the 
characteristic functions and values of the 32 coalitions, 16 bi-level models are needed. The first 
level of the bi-level model is for the leader coalition of OC and any of its partners, while the 
second level is for the follower coalition of all the other players. Each bi-level model has a pair 
of unique objective functions and a set of constraints, but all the models’ structures are similar 
and could be represented by the same list of notations and functions. The 16 models and their 
constraint sets are listed in Appendix A. For the 16 models, the ith model is recorded as Mi. And 
𝑣𝑖
1 and 𝑣𝑖2 are used to represent the 1
st-level and 2nd-level objective functions of Mi, respectively.  
In the following sub-sections, one type of the cooperation schemes (coalition {OC, P1} 
against coalition {P2, PC, R}) is used to illustrate how a bi-level model (Model 1) should be 
constructed for it and how Model 1 is transferred to one level using KKT conditions. Notations 
from Chapter 3 and 4 will be continually used.  
5.1.1. Model 1 Illustration 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣11 = 𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝑅𝑝2 −  𝑅𝑝𝑐 − 𝑅𝑟 = ∑ 𝑅𝑗 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗𝑗 − ∑ �𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑆𝑗𝑠 ∗𝑗,𝑠
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗
𝑆𝑍𝑠
� − ∑ �𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑃𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑗
𝑠 ∗
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗
𝑆𝑍𝑠
�𝑗 − 𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑝𝑟2 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑐𝑟 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢1  
  (5.1) 
Subject to 
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∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 ≥ 𝐷𝑀𝐷  (5.2) 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗),∀𝑗  (5.3) 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≥ 0,∀𝑗 (5.4) 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣12 = 𝑓𝑝2 + 𝑓𝑝𝑐 + 𝑓𝑟 = (𝑝𝑟2 − 𝑃𝑅𝐿2) ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − (𝑐𝑟 − 𝐶𝑅𝐿) ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − (𝑟𝑟 − 𝑅𝑅𝐿) ∗
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 (5.5) 
Subject to 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2  (5.6) 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈  (5.7) 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈  (5.8) 
Equation 5.1 is total profit function of the coalition {OC, P1}, which is a function of 
OC’s revenue minus total vessel operating cost, container handling cost at P1, and OC’s 
payments to P2, PC, and railroad. Equations 5.2 to 5.3 are demand and capacity constraints. 
Equation 5.5 is the 2nd-level objective function—the total profit function of coalition {P2, PC, R}. 
It is a function of rates and shipment volume. The constraints at the second level set the upper 
and lower bounds for the rate variables. The Lagrangian function of the 2nd-level problem is 
given as below. 
𝐿(𝑝𝑟2, 𝑐𝑟, 𝑟𝑟) = (𝑝𝑟2 − 𝑃𝑅𝐿2)𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − (𝑐𝑟 − 𝐶𝑅𝐿)𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − (𝑟𝑟 − 𝑅𝑅𝐿)𝑓𝑒𝑢1 +
𝑢1(𝑝𝑟2 − 𝑃𝑅𝐿2 − 𝑠12) + 𝑢2(𝑃𝑅𝑈2 − 𝑝𝑟2 − 𝑠22) + 𝑢3(𝑟𝑟 − 𝑅𝑅𝐿 − 𝑠32) + 𝑢4(𝑅𝑅𝑈 − 𝑟𝑟 − 𝑠42) +
𝑢5(𝑐𝑟 − 𝐶𝑅𝐿 − 𝑠52) + 𝑢6(𝐶𝑅𝑈 − 𝑐𝑟 − 𝑠62) (5.9) 
 Using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) transformation, the new single-level model is 
shown by Equations 5.10 to 5.21.  
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  𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑣11 = 𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝑅𝑝2 −  𝑅𝑝𝑐 − 𝑅𝑟 = (∑ 𝑅𝑗) ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗𝑗 − ∑ �𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑠 × 𝑇𝑆𝑗𝑠 ×𝑗
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗
𝑆𝑍𝑠
� − ∑ �𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑃𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑃𝑗
𝑠 ∗
𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑗
𝑆𝑍𝑠
�𝑗 − 𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑝𝑟2 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑐𝑟 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑓𝑒𝑢1  
  (5.10) 
 Subject to 
 ∑ �feuj�j ≥ DMD  (5.11) 
 feuj ≤ Cap(j),∀j (5.12) 
 feuj ≥ 0,∀j  (5.13) 
 PRL2 ≤ pr2 ≤ PRU2 (5.14)     
 RRL ≤ rr ≤ RRU (5.15) 
 CRL ≤ cr ≤ CRU (5.16) 
 ∇f(x∗) + ∑ ui∇gi(x∗)i∈Active = 0   (5.17) 
 gi(x∗) − si2 = 0, i = 1, 2, … ,6  (5.18) 
 uigi(x∗) = 0, i = 1,2, … , 6  (5.19) 
 si2 ≥ 0, i = 1,2, … 6  (5.20) 
 ui ≥ 0, i = 1,2, … 6  (5.21) 
5.1.2. Model Solution and Shapley Value Calculation 
After KKT transformation, the new single-level model has a set of complementary 
slackness constraints, and also has a nonlinear non-convex objective function. Usually, a global 
optimization algorithm is needed to guarantee a real optimal solution. For this model, however, 
the optimal rates could be easily found by solving the constraint sets first. The objective function 
thus becomes a linear function with only shipment volume variables, and the problem becomes a 
linear programming problem, whose global optimal solution equals the local solution. SAS 9.3 is 
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applied to solve all 16 models. Based on Equation 3.8, each player’s Shapley value calculation is 
presented in Equation 5.22 to Equation 5.26.  
Terminal 1’s Shapley Value: 
  ∅P1 =  4!0!5! (v151 − v141 ) + 3!1!5! (v131 − v101 ) + 3!1!5! (v121 − v91) + 3!1!5! (v111 − v81) +
3!1!
5! (v02 − v12) + 2!2!5! (v71 − v41) + 2!2!5! (v61 − v31) + 2!2!5! (v51 − v21) + 2!2!5! (v42 − v72) + 2!2!5! (v32 −v62) + 2!2!5! (v22 − v52) + 3!1!5! (v11 − v01) + 3!1!5! (v82 − v112 ) + 3!1!5! (v92 − v122 ) + 3!1!5! (v102 − v132 ) +
4!
5! (v142 − v152 )  (5.22) 
Terminal 2’s Shapley Value: 
 ∅P2 =  4!0!5! (v151 − v131 ) + 3!1!5! (v141 − v101 ) + 3!1!5! (v121 − v71) + 3!1!5! (v111 − v61) +
3!1!
5! (v02 − v22) + 2!2!5! (v91 − v41) + 2!2!5! (v81 − v31) + 2!2!5! (v51 − v11) + 2!2!5! (v42 − v92) + 2!2!5! (v32 −v82) + 2!2!5! (v12 − v52) + 3!1!5! (v21 − v01) + 3!1!5! (v62 − v112 ) + 3!1!5! (v72 − v122 ) + 3!1!5! (v102 − v142 ) +
4!
5! (v132 − v152 ) (5.23) 
 Panama Canal’s Shapley value:  ∅PC =  4!0!5! (v151 − v121 ) + 3!1!5! (v141 − v91) + 3!1!5! (v131 − v71) + 3!1!5! (v111 − v51) +
3!1!
5! (v02 − v32) + 2!2!5! (v101 − v41) + 2!2!5! (v81 − v21) + 2!2!5! (v61 − v11) + 2!2!5! (v42 − v102 ) +
2!2!
5! (v22 − v82) + 2!2!5! (v12 − v62) + 3!1!5! (v31 − v01) + 3!1!5! (v52 − v112 ) + 3!1!5! (v72 − v132 ) +
3!1!
5! (v92 − v142 ) + 4!5! (v122 − v152 )  (5.24)    
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 Railway’s Shapley value:  ∅R =  4!0!5! (v151 − v111 ) + 3!1!5! (v141 − v81) + 3!1!5! (v131 − v61) + 3!1!5! (v121 − v51) +
3!1!
5! (v02 − v42) + 2!2!5! (v101 − v31) + 2!2!5! (v91 − v21) + 2!2!5! (v71 − v11) + 2!2!5! (v32 − v102 ) +
2!2!
5! (v22 − v92) + 2!2!5! (v12 − v72) + 3!1!5! (v41 − v01) + 3!1!5! (v52 − v122 ) + 3!1!5! (v62 − v132 ) +
3!1!
5! (v82 − v142 ) + 4!5! (v112 − v152 )  (5.25)  Ocean carrier’s Shapley value:  ∅OC =  4!0!5! (v151 −  v02) + 3!1!5! (v141 − v12) + 3!1!5! (v131 − v22) + 3!1!5! (v121 − v32) +
3!1!
5! (v111 − v42) + 2!2!5! (v101 − v52) + 2!2!5! (v91 − v62) + 2!2!5! (v81 − v72) + 2!2!5! (v71 − v82) +
2!2!
5! (v61 − v92) + 2!2!5! (v51 − v102 ) + 3!1!5! (v41 − v112 ) + 3!1!5! (v31 − v122 ) + 3!1!5! (v21 − v132 ) +
3!1!
5! (v11 − v142 ) + 4!5! (v01 − v152 )  (5.26) 
5.2. Parameter Estimates 
5.2.1. Daily Vessel Operating Cost 
Vessel operating cost is a function of shipping speed, fuel consumption rate, and other 
variable costs, including fuel, crew, maintenance, and administration costs. The Army Corps of 
Engineers Aggregated Vessel Operating Cost Model (AVOCM) has input values regarding ship 
size, speed, fuel usage rate, and average opportunity cost of capital, as well as other endogenized 
costs like insurance and operating cost (Army Corps of Engineers 2007). Fan (2010) used daily 
charter rates to replace AVCOM’s fixed capital asset and operating costs and derived the 
estimation functions for the daily vessel operating cost (Equations 6.27 and 6.28). This study re-
estimates the vessel operating costs using updated fuel prices and daily hire rates from the 
Bloomberg Professional Service database (Bloomberg L. P. 2013a, b).  
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𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑠 = 𝐴𝑈𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐷𝑂 + 𝐸𝐶𝑠 ∗ 𝐻𝑉𝑂 + 𝐷𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  (5.27) 
𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑃𝑠 = 𝐴𝑈𝑠 ∗ 𝑀𝐷𝑂 + 𝐷𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠  (5.28) 
𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑆𝑠:  Daily vessel cost at sea for container vessel of size s (dollars) 
𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑃𝑠:  Daily vessel cost at port for container vessel of size s (dollars) 
𝐴𝑈𝑠:  Bunkerage consumption rate for auxiliary power generation for container 
vessel of size s (metric tons/day) 
𝐸𝐶𝑠: Bunkerage consumption rate for propulsion mover(s) for container vessel 
of size s at economic speed (metric tons/day) 
𝑀𝐷𝑂:  Marine diesel oil price (dollars/metric ton) 
𝐻𝑉𝑂:   Heavy viscosity oil price (dollars/metric ton) 
𝐷𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠:  Daily charter rate of container vessel of size s (dollars/day) 
The values of economic speed and engine fuel consumption rates for different container 
ship sizes are available from AVOCM. Only 4,000-TEU and 8,000-TEU vessels are used in the 
case study (Table 5.1). Fuel prices fluctuate vastly through time. Figure 5.1 shows the HVO and 
MDO price changes from April 2010 to March 2013. The average price from 2010 to 2012 based 
on the Los Angeles price (Bloomberg L. P. 2013a) is used: $917 per metric ton for MDO and 
$603 per metric ton for HVO (380 centistokes).  
Table 5.1. Fuel Consumption Rates and Economic Speeds of the Vessels 
Vessel 
Category 
Vessel size 
(TEU) 
AU 
(MT/Day) 
EC 
(MT/Day) 
Economic Speed 
(NM/Hour) 
Panamax 4,000 3.9 103.2 21.3 
PostPanamax 8,000 5.2 202.6 25 
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Figure 5.1. HVO and MDO Price Changes 
 
  
Figure 5.2. Daily Hire Rates Changes 
The daily hire rate changes for vessel sizes of 11,100 TEU, 1,700 TEU, 2,500 TEU, 
3,500 TEU, and 4,250 TEU from 2010 to 2012 are shown in Figure 5.2 (Bloomberg L. P. 2013a). 
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The average values from 2010 to 2012 are used to estimate a regression function of daily hire 
rates on vessel size s (Equation 6.29). The estimated values of a and b are 30 and 0.7672. The 
estimation R2 is 0.97 (Figure 5.3). The daily hire rates for the vessels for different vessel sizes 
are predicted using the regression function. Daily hire rate is estimated as $16,820 for a 4,000- 
TEU vessel and $28,627 for an 8,000-TEU vessel.  
𝐷𝐻𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 = 𝑎 ∗ 𝑠𝑏  (5.29) 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Daily Hire Rates Estimation 
 
5.2.2. Transit Time Estimates 
Container terminals usually operate approximately 28 to 35 moves per crane per hour at 
top North American ports (Le-Griffin and Murphy 2006). Container productivity is critical for 
container ports like LA and NF. Thus, it is assumed both terminals in the case have the capacity 
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to efficiently handle the PostPanama vessels, and there will be no difference between the two 
ports’ vessel handling time. With three cranes with 35 moves per crane per hour serving a vessel 
with a capacity of 8,000 TEU and a loading factor of 0.8, it takes about 2.5 days to off-load the 
vessel. With two cranes with 30 moves per crane per hour serving a vessel with capacity of 4,000 
TEU and loading factor of 0.8, it takes about 2.2 days. Considering other activities (paperwork, 
waiting, supply, etc.) that further cost more time, the total port time is estimated as three days for 
the PostPanamax vessel (8,000 TEU) and 2.5 days for the Panamax vessel (4,000 TEU).  
Additional days are needed when the Panama Canal is used for the ECR. The Canal uses 
two quality service-level indicators: 1) average waiting time to transit the Canal; and 2) average 
transit time. Their combination is called Canal Waters Time (CWT) (Panama Canal Authority 
2006). On average, the transit time takes eight to 10 hours to go through the Canal (Panama 
Canal Authority 2010). The waiting time could vary depending on the congestion condition and 
whether a transit is reserved beforehand. Typically, the reserved CWT is about 17 hours (0.7 
days) versus 36 hours (1.5 days) for non-reserved (Wilson, Dahl, and Fan 2010). For the ECR, 
1.5 days are added to port time. The time at sea is calculated using economic speeds from the 
AVOCM model for each vessel size (Army Corps of Engineers 2007). Table 5.2 lists the 
economic speed, port distance overseas, traveling time at sea, and time at port used in the case 
study.  
Table 5.2. Vessel Time Estimates 
  
Economic Speed 
(nautical 
miles/hour) 
Sea Distance 
(nautical miles) 
Time at Sea 
(days) 
Time at Port 
(days) 
LA 8,000 TEU 25 7,455 10.6 3 
NF 8,000 TEU 25 12,883 18.4 4.5 
NF 4,000 TEU 21.3 12,883 21.6 4 
Sources: Data from Fan (2010) and Army Corps of Engineers (2007). 
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The railway shipment time from LA to Norfolk, VA, is calculated from two segments: 
LA to Chicago and Chicago to Norfolk. Based on the two segments’ estimated shipment time 
(Table 5.3), the total inland container transit time is estimated to be four days for LA to Norfolk, 
VA. The transit time from Norfolk to VA is assumed to be 0.5 days. It is assumed that 
cooperation between any transportation operator (the terminal, the Panama Canal, or the railroad) 
and the OC will save the OC half a day of normal transit time. 
Table 5.3. Container Inland Time Estimates for WCR 
  Railway Company Mileage 
Speed 
(mph) Days 
LA to Chicago BNSF 2,161 36 2.5 
Chicago to Norfolk, VA CSX 964 30 1.34 
Source: Data from Fan (2010). 
5.2.3. Inventory Cost 
Other than transportation cost paid directly to carriers, another major cost sector for 
shippers is the opportunity cost of working capital tied up in the inventory throughout the supply 
chain. Although it is assumed that the OC chooses the optimal routes to maximize its profit and 
that inventory costs are not directly reflected in the OC’s profit function, the difference of the 
transit time has implicit impact on the OC’s route choice. To reflect shippers’ perceptions of 
shipping speed, different charging rates of the OC are assumed. The OC’s charging rate R1 for a 
quicker route (WCR in this case) is set to be higher than R2 for the slower ECR. The reason is 
that quicker delivery saves shippers inventory cost. To estimate the difference between the two 
rates, Equation 6.30 is derived based on Wardrop’s First Principle. At equilibrium, both routes 
should have equalized lowest cost for the shippers. Irt is the inventory cost for route rt (rt = 1 or 
2). 
𝑅1 + 𝐼1 = 𝑅2 + 𝐼2 (5.30) 
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There are three types of inventories in a supply chain: cycle inventory, safety stock, and 
pipeline inventory. Cycle inventory is a function of the replenishment frequency and is 
independent of the selection of the route, and therefore is irrelevant for route choices. Safety 
stock is the extra inventory kept to satisfy the customer demand on time. It is a function of the 
customer service level, the uncertainties in the shipment lead time, and the demand forecast error 
(Jula and Leachman 2011a). Assuming demand is deterministic and there is no shipment 
uncertainty, safety stock is not considered as well. Pipeline inventory is the amount of inventory 
in transit. The annual inventory cost per unit is a function of the transportation time and daily 
unit pipeline inventory cost (DPC) (Equation 6.31). DPC is calculated as an inventory carrying 
rate (annual interest rate for commercial loans) times the amount of capital invested per unit of 
inventory (Equation 6.32). 
𝐼𝑟𝑡 = 𝐷𝑃𝐶 ∗ 𝑇𝑟𝑡 (5.31) 
𝐷𝑃𝐶 = 𝑟 ∗ 𝑈𝑉/365 (5.32) 
𝐼𝑟𝑡:  Total annual pipeline inventory cost per FEU for route rt (dollars) 
𝐷𝑃𝐶: Daily pipeline inventory cost per FEU (dollars) 
𝑇𝑟𝑡: Transit time per FEU for route rt (days) 
𝑟:  Annual interest rate 
𝑈𝑉:  Average cargo value per FEU (dollars) 
 Jula and Leachman (2011b) suggest a 20% inventory carrying rate per year for 
replenishment of goods with long-term demand, and 50% if retail prices are declining with time 
or if the products experience rapid obsolescence. An average inventory carrying rate of 35% is 
assumed for simplicity. Using joint data from PIERS database, World Trade Atlas (WTA) 
database, and Pacific Maritime Association’s database,  Leachman (2010) calculated the average 
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declared values per cubic foot for containerized imports from Asia to different coast ports in the 
United States (Table 5.4). The average cargo value per FEU (UV) is estimated assuming the 
average usable space is about 2,684 cubic feet for a high-cube 40-foot container (9.5-foot high 
and 40-foot long). Using Equation 6.32, daily pipeline inventory cost (DPC) is estimated in 
Table 5.4. Using daily pipeline inventory cost of $56.00 per day and Equation 6.30, the charging 
rate difference between the two routes is calculated as 𝑅1 − 𝑅2 = 𝐼2 − 𝐼1 = 56(𝑇2 − 𝑇1).  
Table 5.4. Daily Pipeline Inventory Cost Calculation 
  Asia to U.S. Asia to West Coast Asia to East/Gulf Coast 
Cargo Value ($/cu ft) 21.66 22.66 18.57 
UV ($/FEU) 58,135.44 60,819.44 49,841.88 
DPC ($/FEU/Day) 55.75 58.32 47.79 
 Source: Compiled using data from Leachman (2010). 
5.2.4. Transportation Rates  
 Shipping rates, terminal charges, canal tolls, and railway rates are all sensitive 
information and very volatile through time. Spot market rates from public sources are obtained to 
estimate general ranges.  
5.2.4.1. Trans-Pacific shipping rates 
 On August 16, 2013, according to SCFI data issued by the Shanghai Shipping Exchange, 
the spot rate from Shanghai to the U.S. West Coast was $1,941 per FEU, 27.7% below the level 
in the same week last year and 12.6%, or $280, less than at the beginning of 2013. The spot rate 
to the U.S. East Coast was $3,408 in the week ending August 16, 13.6% down from the same 
week in 2012, but up 1.5%, or $50, from January 1 (Journal of Commerce 2013c). For the case 
study, the shipping rate R1 charged by the OC for the all-water route (WCR) is assumed to be 
$3,400 per FEU. Depending on the vessel size used for ECR, the transit time and inventory cost 
differences between the two routes will be different. Using Equations 6.30, 6.31, and 6.32, the 
shipping rate R2 for the transcontinental route (ECR) could be derived accordingly.  
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5.2.4.2. Railroad charging rates 
The rail rate ranges are estimated based on the most current Public Use Waybill File (U.S. 
Surface Transportation Board 2011), which contains sample data on rail shipments from origin 
Business Economic Area (BEA) to termination BEA. Because there is no railroad company with 
direct shipment from Los Angeles to Norfolk on its own network, the rail route is analyzed based 
on the LA-Chicago segment (operated by BNSF) and the Chicago-Norfolk, VA, segment 
(operated by CSX). The line haul rates per container are calculated using “Expanded Freight 
Revenue” divided by “Expanded Trailer/Container Count” for shipments from LA (BEA = 160) 
to Chicago (BEA = 64), and for shipments from Chicago to Norfolk, VA (BEA = 20). Only 
containerized cargoes (STCC2 = “46”) are counted. The calculated rates are summarized in 
Table 5.5.  
Using the lowest record as the lower bound of railroad rates and the 90% percentile value 
as the upper bound, the railroad rate for LA to Norfolk, VA, is estimated to range from $1,420 to 
$3,400 per container. As the railway does not report the size of the containers, it is assumed the 
majority of those are 53-foot domestic containers.  
According to spot market reports, the west-to-east door-to-door spot rates in early May 
2013 were about $2,300 for a 53-foot intermodal container, and the spot rate for Los Angeles-
New Jersey fell 2.4% ($80) to $3,285 in the second week of May (Journal of Commerce 2013d). 
In early August, the west to east bound rate rose again to about $2,390. The largest increase in 
the first week of August was the Los Angeles-Atlanta route: 2.4% ($70) to $3,000 (Journal of 
Commerce 2013b). Comparing the two sources, the lower and upper bound estimates for the 
railroad rates are reasonable for this study.  
 
 
63 
 
Table 5.5. Railway Shipment Rates Summary 
 Quantile LA-Chicago Rate Chicago-NF Rate 
100% Max 3670 2751 
99% 2187 1835 
95% 1997 1584 
90% 1887 1511 
75% Q3 1692 1388 
50% Median 1435 1163 
25% Q1 1184 1043 
10% 1007 957 
5% 870 901 
1% 756 843 
0% Min 665 756 
 
The rates are transferred from 35-foot containers to high-cube 40-foot containers based 
on the usage capacity ratios. Usable capacity for a domestic container (a 35-foot-long container) 
is about 4,000 cubic feet and 2,684 cubic feet for a high-cube 40-foot container . Therefore, the 
final upper and lower bounds for railroad rates for ECR are estimated as $953 per FEU and 
$2,280 per FEU, respectively. 
5.2.4.3. Port and Panama Canal charging rates 
The average terminal handling cost for some European countries could be found through 
the APL website (www.APL.com). Those rates range from $127 to $300 per container. Based on 
personal communication with Chuck Raymond (former CEO of Horizon Lines, Inc.) and David 
Smith (CEO of Work Cat Engineering LLC), the lowest expected container handling rate at 
some terminals of the Norfolk port is about $150 per container. Assuming there is no big 
difference between the two ports’ costs and charging rates, the lower and upper bounds of the 
terminal charges for the case study are set as $150 and $300, respectively.   
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Compared with the other rates, the Panama Canal tolls are relatively easy to estimate. The 
canal tolls were $54/TEU in 2007 and $72/TEU in 2009 and 2010. Including ancillary fees, the 
total fee in 2010 is about $88/TEU if booking service is used, while about $80/TEU without 
booking beforehand (Wilson, Dahl, and Fan 2010). The CEO of Maersk Line said the fees for 
ships to go through the Panama Canal have tripled in the past five years to $450,000 per passage 
for a vessel carrying 4,500 containers since 2009 (Park 2013). That is about $100/TEU if all the 
containers are 20 feet. The lower bound of the Panama Canal rate is set as $160/FEU, and the 
upper bound is set as $220/FEU.  
  
65 
 
6. RESULT ANALYSIS  
6.1. Model Results and CGT Solutions 
As stated in Chapter 5, the container vessel used for the East Coast route (ECR) is 4,000 
TEU before the Panama Canal expansion is finished and 8,000 TEU after the expansion. The 
West Coast route (WCR) is served by 8,000-TEU vessels both before and after the expansion. 
For all ships, 80% carry capacity is assumed. The total containerized demand at the destination 
(Norfolk, VA) is assumed to be 64,000 FEU annually, and is shared by the two routes. To 
analyze the impact of capacity constraints, the models are both calculated with assumptions that 
there are no terminal TEU capacity constraints, and with assumptions that both terminals could 
only handle 80% of total container demand. Hence, in all, four scenarios are compared. 
Scenario 1 (S1): “Base Case: Before Canal Expansion & No Capacity Constraints.” 
Scenario 2 (S2): “After Canal Expansion & No Capacity Constraints.” 
Scenario 3 (S3): “Before Canal Expansion & Capacity Constraints at Terminals.”  
Scenario 4 (S4): “After Canal Expansion & Capacity Constraints at Terminals.” 
The models’ results are in Appendix B Table B1, Table B2, Table B3, and Table B4. As 
Model 15’s result shows, if the grand coalition is formed, the OC prefers the WCR before the 
Canal expansion is finished. However, after the expansion is finished and both routes are served 
by the 8,000-TEU vessel, the OC chooses ECR via the Panama Canal because of a higher profit.  
The Shapley values are presented in Table 6.1. In order to compare scenarios, the ratios 
of the Shapley Value are also calculated in each scenario and listed in Table 6.1. The ratios are a 
reflection of players’ relative market powers under each scenario. A player’s Shapley value is the 
total profit allocation for that player because the models’ objective functions are profit 
maximization. The values are all divided by 64,000 for the purpose of easy presentation and 
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interpretation. In that way, the Shapley value could be directly interpreted as a unit profit per 
FEU because the total shipment volume is 64,000 FEU, except for the players in S3 and S4. 
Under the capacity constraint assumption in S3 and S4, both routes handle part of the total 
shipment volume by the OC. So to get the real profit per FEU for those players in S3 and S4, the 
Shapley value has to be multiplied by 64,000 and divided by the number of real container 
volume handled by that player. The translated unit profit per FEU values are presented in Table 
6.2.  
Table 6.1. Shapley Values and Value Ratios in S1, S2, S3, S4 
  P1 P2 R PC OC Total 
S1 56.62 62.33 75.50 35.56 1807.68 2037.69 
S2 0.00 152.60 0.00 72.14 1955.26 2180.00 
S3 80.82 63.94 337.22 31.82 1589.57 2103.37 
S4 30.53 122.08 265.40 57.71 1645.61 2121.34 
S1 Ratio 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.89 1.00 
S2 Ratio 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.90 1.00 
S3 Ratio 0.04 0.03 0.16 0.01 0.75 1.00 
S4 Ratio 0.01 0.06 0.13 0.03 0.78 1.00 
 
Table 6.2. Unit Profit Values in S1, S2, S3, S4 
  P1 P2 R PC OC 
S1 56.62 62.33 75.50 35.56 1807.68 
S2 0.00 152.60 0.00 72.14 1955.26 
S3 101.03 319.71 414.24 159.09 1589.57 
S4 152.66 152.60 1327.00 72.14 1645.61 
 
Using Theorem 1 to test if the Shapley Values are in the core, the total payment to the 
members in every possible coalition 𝑆 ⊂ 𝑁 is compared with v(S). All four sets of Shapley 
values are tested in Tables 6.3 to 6.6 with the values of ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑖∈𝑆  (sum of Shapley Values), v(S), 
and their differences listed. If some of the differences between ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑖∈𝑆  and v(S) are negative (the 
last column), the Shapley Value is not in the core. For a solution not in the core, the solution may 
not be fully accepted by the players; and some players may defect to other coalitions that offer 
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them better profits. But the Shapley value still works as a measure of relative market power of 
the players, since it measures the average attribution made by each player. As Tables 6.3 to 
Table 6.6 show, both S1 and S3’s Shapley values are not in the core.  
Table 6.3. Coalition Values for S1 
players v(S) OC P1 P2 PC R sum(yi) 
sum(yi) -
v(S) 
OC 1716.25 1807.68         1807.68 91.43 
OC P1 1716.25 1807.68 56.62       1864.30 148.05 
OC P2 1872.50 1807.68   62.33     1870.01 -2.49 
OC PC 1801.88 1807.68     35.56   1843.24 41.37 
OC R 1882.38 1807.68       75.50 1883.18 0.80 
OC P1 P2 1872.50 1807.68 56.62 62.33     1926.63 54.13 
OC P1 Pc 1801.88 1807.68 56.62   35.56   1899.86 97.99 
OC P1 R 2037.69 1807.68 56.62     75.50 1939.80 -97.89 
OC P2 PC 1958.13 1807.68   62.33 35.56   1905.57 -52.55 
OC P2 R 1882.38 1807.68   62.33   75.50 1945.51 63.13 
OC PC R 1882.38 1807.68     35.56 75.50 1918.74 36.36 
OC P1 P2 PC 1958.13 1807.68 56.62 62.33 35.56   1962.19 4.07 
OC P1 P2 R 2037.69 1807.68 56.62 62.33   75.50 2002.13 -35.56 
OC P1 PC R 2037.69 1807.68 56.62   35.56 75.50 1975.36 -62.33 
OC P2 PC R 1958.13 1807.68   62.33 35.56 75.50 1981.07 22.94 
OC P1 P2 PC R 2037.69 1807.68 56.62 62.33 35.56 75.50 2037.69 0.00 
P1 P2 PC R 210.00   56.62 62.33 35.56 75.50 230.00 20.00 
P2 PC R 210.00     62.33 35.56 75.50 173.38 -36.62 
P1 PC R 60.00   56.62   35.56 75.50 167.67 107.67 
P1 P2 R 150.00   56.62 62.33   75.50 194.45 44.45 
P1 P2 PC 150.00   56.62 62.33 35.56   154.51 4.51 
PC R 60.00       35.56 75.50 111.05 51.05 
P2 R 150.00     62.33   75.50 137.82 -12.18 
P2 PC 0.00     62.33 35.56   97.89 97.89 
P1 R 0.00   56.62     75.50 132.12 132.12 
P1 PC 150.00   56.62   35.56   92.18 -57.82 
P1 P2 150.00   56.62 62.33     118.95 -31.05 
R 0.00         75.50 75.50 75.50 
PC 0.00       35.56   35.56 35.56 
P2 0.00     62.33     62.33 62.33 
P1 0.00   56.62       56.62 56.62 
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Table 6.4. Coalition Values for S2 
players v(S) OC P1 P2 PC R sum(yi) 
sum(yi) -
v(S) 
OC 1940.63 1955.26         1955.26 14.64 
OC P1 1940.63 1955.26 0.00       1955.26 14.64 
OC P2 2095.63 1955.26   152.60     2107.86 12.24 
OC PC 2024.69 1955.26     72.14   2027.40 2.71 
OC R 1940.63 1955.26       0.00 1955.26 14.64 
OC P1 P2 2095.63 1955.26 0.00 152.60     2107.86 12.24 
OC P1 Pc 2024.69 1955.26 0.00   72.14   2027.40 2.71 
OC P1 R 1940.62 1955.26 0.00     0.00 1955.26 14.64 
OC P2 PC 2180.00 1955.26   152.60 72.14   2180.00 0.00 
OC P2 R 2095.63 1955.26   152.60   0.00 2107.86 12.24 
OC PC R 2024.69 1955.26     72.14 0.00 2027.40 2.71 
OC P1 P2 PC 2180.00 1955.26 0.00 152.60 72.14   2180.00 0.00 
OC P1 P2 R 2095.62 1955.26 0.00 152.60   0.00 2107.86 12.24 
OC P1 PC R 2024.69 1955.26 0.00   72.14 0.00 2027.40 2.71 
OC P2 PC R 2180.00 1955.26   152.60 72.14 0.00 2180.00 0.00 
OC P1 P2 PC R 2180.00 1955.26 0.00 152.60 72.14 0.00 2180.00 0.00 
P1 P2 PC R 210.00   0.00 152.60 72.14 0.00 224.74 14.74 
P2 PC R 210.00     152.60 72.14 0.00 224.74 14.74 
P1 PC R 60.00   0.00   72.14 0.00 72.14 12.14 
P1 P2 R 150.00   0.00 152.60   0.00 152.60 2.60 
P1 P2 PC 210.00   0.00 152.60 72.14   224.74 14.74 
PC R 60.00       72.14 0.00 72.14 12.14 
P2 R 150.00     152.60   0.00 152.60 2.60 
P2 PC 210.00     152.60 72.14   224.74 14.74 
P1 R 0.00   0.00     0.00 0.00 0.00 
P1 PC 60.00   0.00   72.14   72.14 12.14 
P1 P2 150.00   0.00 152.60     152.60 2.60 
R 0.00         0.00 0.00 0.00 
PC 60.00       72.14   72.14 12.14 
P2 150.00     152.60     152.60 2.60 
P1 0.00   0.00       0.00 0.00 
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Table 6.5. Coalition Values for S3 
players v(S) OC P1 P2 PC R sum(yi) 
sum(yi) -
v(S) 
OC 1504.47 1589.57         1589.57 85.10 
OC P1 1535.54 1589.57 80.82       1670.40 134.86 
OC P2 1629.48 1589.57   63.94     1653.52 24.04 
OC PC 1572.97 1589.57     31.82   1621.39 48.42 
OC R 1930.75 1589.57       337.22 1926.79 -3.96 
OC P1 P2 1660.54 1589.57 80.82 63.94     1734.34 73.80 
OC P1 Pc 1604.04 1589.57 80.82   31.82   1702.22 98.18 
OC P1 R 2055.00 1589.57 80.82     337.22 2007.62 -47.38 
OC P2 PC 1697.97 1589.57   63.94 31.82   1685.33 -12.64 
OC P2 R 1962.00 1589.57   63.94   337.22 1990.73 28.73 
OC PC R 1947.87 1589.57     31.82 337.22 1958.61 10.73 
OC P1 P2 PC 1729.04 1589.57 80.82 63.94 31.82   1766.16 37.12 
OC P1 P2 R 2086.25 1589.57 80.82 63.94   337.22 2071.56 -14.69 
OC P1 PC R 2072.13 1589.57 80.82   31.82 337.22 2039.43 -32.69 
OC P2 PC R 1942.98 1589.57   63.94 31.82 337.22 2022.55 79.58 
OC P1 P2 PC R 2103.37 1589.57 80.82 63.94 31.82 337.22 2103.37 0.00 
P1 P2 PC R 463.40   80.82 63.94 31.82 337.22 513.80 50.40 
P2 PC R 433.40     63.94 31.82 337.22 432.98 -0.42 
P1 PC R 343.40   80.82   31.82 337.22 449.86 106.46 
P1 P2 R 415.40   80.82 63.94   337.22 481.98 66.58 
P1 P2 PC 162.00   80.82 63.94 31.82   176.58 14.58 
PC R 313.40       31.82 337.22 369.03 55.63 
P2 R 385.40     63.94   337.22 401.16 15.76 
P2 PC 42.00     63.94 31.82   95.76 53.76 
P1 R 295.40   80.82     337.22 418.04 122.64 
P1 PC 132.00   80.82   31.82   112.64 -19.36 
P1 P2 150.00   80.82 63.94     144.77 -5.23 
R 265.40         337.22 337.22 71.82 
PC 12.00       31.82   31.82 19.82 
P2 30.00     63.94     63.94 33.94 
P1 30.00   80.82       80.82 50.82 
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Table 6.6. Coalition Values for S4 
players v(S) OC P1 P2 PC R sum(yi) 
sum(yi) 
-v(S) 
OC 1633.37 1645.61         1645.61 12.24 
OC P1 1664.44 1645.61 30.53       1676.15 11.71 
OC P2 1757.38 1645.61   122.08     1767.70 10.32 
OC PC 1700.62 1645.61     57.71   1703.32 2.70 
OC R 1898.77 1645.61       265.40 1911.01 12.24 
OC P1 P2 1788.44 1645.61 30.53 122.08     1798.23 9.79 
OC P1 Pc 1731.69 1645.61 30.53   57.71   1733.85 2.17 
OC P1 R 1929.84 1645.61 30.53     265.40 1941.55 11.71 
OC P2 PC 1824.87 1645.61   122.08 57.71   1825.41 0.53 
OC P2 R 2022.77 1645.61   122.08   265.40 2033.10 10.32 
OC PC R 1966.02 1645.61     57.71 265.40 1968.72 2.70 
OC P1 P2 PC 1855.94 1645.61 30.53 122.08 57.71   1855.94 0.00 
OC P1 P2 R 2053.84 1645.61 30.53 122.08   265.40 2063.63 9.79 
OC P1 PC R 1997.09 1645.61 30.53   57.71 265.40 1999.25 2.17 
OC P2 PC R 2090.28 1645.61   122.08 57.71 265.40 2090.81 0.53 
OC P1 P2 PC R 2121.34 1645.61 30.53 122.08 57.71 265.40 2121.34 0.00 
P1 P2 PC R 463.40   30.53 122.08 57.71 265.40 475.72 12.32 
P2 PC R 433.40     122.08 57.71 265.40 445.19 11.79 
P1 PC R 343.40   30.53   57.71 265.40 353.64 10.24 
P1 P2 R 415.40   30.53 122.08   265.40 418.01 2.61 
P1 P2 PC 198.00   30.53 122.08 57.71   210.32 12.32 
PC R 313.40       57.71 265.40 323.11 9.71 
P2 R 385.40     122.08   265.40 387.48 2.08 
P2 PC 168.00     122.08 57.71   179.79 11.79 
P1 R 295.40   30.53     265.40 295.93 0.53 
P1 PC 78.00   30.53   57.71   88.24 10.24 
P1 P2 150.00   30.53 122.08     152.61 2.61 
R 265.40         265.40 265.40 0.00 
PC 48.00       57.71   57.71 9.71 
P2 120.00     122.08     122.08 2.08 
P1 30.00   30.53       30.53 0.53 
 
Next, LC and MMC are calculated and the results are presented in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. 
Both LC and MMC results prove that the core is empty for scenarios S1 and S3 (ε > 0 and η < 1), 
while the core exists for S2 and S4 (ε <= 0 and η >= 1). The three methods are compared in 
Figures 6.1 to 6.4. The LC and the MMC give relatively similar profit allocations with the 
Shapley Value. These two solutions are also much easier to calculate compared with the Shapley 
value.  
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Table 6.7. Least Core for S1, S2, S3 and S4 
Scenario epsilon P1 P2 R PC OC Total 
S1 62.32 56.52 31.16 85.36 31.16 1833.49 2037.69 
S2 0.00 0.00 155.31 0.00 84.06 1940.62 2180.00 
S3 24.91 95.09 31.25 335.21 42.03 1599.79 2103.37 
S4 0.00 31.06 124.25 265.40 48.00 1652.62 2121.34 
S1 ratio   0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.90 1.00 
S2 ratio   0.00 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.89 1.00 
S3 Ratio   0.05 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.76 1.00 
S4 Ratio   0.01 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.78 1.00 
 
Table 6.8. Minmax Core for S1, S2, S3 and S4 
Scenario eta P1 P2 R PC OC Total 
S1 0.9478222 89.01 53.16 92.72 53.16 1749.63 2037.69 
S2 1 0.00 155.31 0.00 84.06 1940.62 2180.00 
S3 0.9768657 117.22 49.03 327.46 46.89 1562.78 2103.37 
S4 1 31.06 120.00 265.40 48.00 1656.87 2121.34 
S1 ratio   0.04 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.86 1.00 
S2 ratio   0.00 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.89 1.00 
S3 Ratio   0.06 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.74 1.00 
S4 Ratio   0.01 0.06 0.13 0.02 0.78 1.00 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Comparisons of Shapley Value, LC, MMC for S1 
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Figure 6.2. Comparisons of Shapley Value, LC, MMC for S2 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Comparisons of Shapley Value, LC, MMC for S3 
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Figure 6.4. Comparisons of Shapley Value, LC, MMC for S4 
 
6.2. Result Interpretation 
Although the Shapley value solution is not in the core for all scenarios and two scenarios 
actually have an empty core, a close examination at the results and comparison of the scenario 
differences could reveal the relative market power of those players, their interacting relationships, 
and the reasons why the grand coalition is unstable.  
In the Base Scenario (S1), the OC ships all containers via Terminal 1 and the railroad 
(West Coast route). Of the total $126,784,000 (1981*64,000) coalition profit, the OC gets 89%, 
the railroad gets 4%, the two terminals each get 3%, and the Canal gets 2%. Although OC ships 
zero containers to P2 and the Panama Canal in S1 (See Table B1), the Shapley value suggests 
that P2 and the Panama Canal still get positive profit allocations. Terminal 2 gets a total of 
$3,989,120 (62.33*64,000) and the Panama Canal gets $2,275,840 (35.56*64,000). These profit 
allocations are not a container handling revenue to the two players; instead, they are rewards to 
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them for their willingness to cooperate. The total profit gained by OC, P1, and the railroad has to 
be shared with P2 and the Panama Canal, otherwise the OC may not ship via the WCR as in 
Model 0, Model 1, etc. Apparently, this allocation is hard to accept by the other players. As the 
core theory applies, the grand coalition in S1 is unstable. Some players would defect to a 
different coalition solution. In the next chapter, two small coalitions will be analyzed and 
compared to the grand coalition.   
In the second scenario after the Panama Canal is expanded, the OC ships all containers 
via Terminal 2 and the Panama Canal. The total coalition profit increases, so does the profit 
share of the OC, P2, and PC. On the other hand, P1 and R get zero allocation. In S2, the grand 
coalition has an un-empty core, and the Shapley value is in the core.  
Comparing S1 and S2 (Figure 6.5), the relative market powers of the Canal and the port 
on the East Coast (PC and P2) both increase after the Canal expansion is completed while the 
powers of the WCR players (P1 and R) both decrease. The OC’s Shapley value also increases 
after the expansion, but in a smaller magnitude than the PC and P1.  
 
Figure 6.5. Panama Canal Expansion Impact S1 vs. S2  
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Figure 6.6. Panama Canal Expansion Impact S3 vs. S4 
 
The capacity constraints will not change much of the impact of the Canal expansion 
(Figure 6.6). But under terminal capacity constraint assumption, the absolute values of the 
change for all players are smaller, except for the OC. A check on the unit profit value changes in 
Table 6.2 reveals, however, that the East Coast players (P2, PC) get smaller profits per FEU after 
the Canal is expanded, assuming there is not enough container handling capacity at the terminals. 
There are several reasons for this “unfair” result. One is the PC’s lower and upper bound rates 
have been assumed unchanged after the expansion, which is unrealistic. Another is that, as has 
been discussed in the previous section, the “before expansion” scenarios have an unstable grand 
coalition, and the Shapley value allocations to the EC players could be hardly realized in practice. 
Finally, Figures 6.7 and 6.8 are created to illustrate the impact of capacity constraint 
assumption. It seems that the capacity constraint has opposite effects on the Shapley values of 
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the OC and the railroad. When both terminals do have not enough resources to handle all 
shipments, the OC loses profits while the railroad gains more.  
 
Figure 6.7. Terminal Capacity Constraint Impact S1 vs. S3  
 
 
Figure 6.8. Terminal Capacity Constraint Impact S2 vs. S4 
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Both LC and MMC results prove that the core is empty for scenarios S1 and S3 (ε > 0 
and η < 1), while the core exists for S2 and S4 (ε <= 0 and η >= 1).  An empty core indicates the 
grand coalition is not stable, in the sense that there is no allocation solution that is not dominated 
by other solutions, so that at least one player will defect to a different coalition, causing the 
grand coalition to deform. In this case study, the ocean carrier is the dominant player and has two 
route choices, causing the competition between the two routes unavoidable. Actually, a close 
look at the S2 results reveals the reason that they could form a stable grand coalition in S2 is 
because the OC always chooses the ECR no matter what kind of coalition is formed, and all 
allocation methods (Shapley Value, LC, MMC) assign zero profits to the WCR players. Later it 
is found that by changing some parameter values the results could change easily. Overall, the 
grand coalition of the five players is very unstable.  
6.3. Sensitivity Analysis 
This section presents a sensitivity analysis on some model parameter values, and 
discusses their impacts on the roles of the players in the container shipping market. The analysis 
is based on the base scenario S1.The first parameter to be analyzed is the inventory cost 
difference. In the model, the inventory cost is not directly included in the OC’s cost function, 
because it is a cost to shippers. The shippers with higher valued goods are willing to pay more in 
order to get quicker delivery. The shippers’ perceptions of delivery speed are reflected by the 
OC’s charging rates. In order to charge more, the OC chooses a quicker route (WCR). The 
difference between the two charging rates (R1 for WCR vs. R2 for ECR) is the average unit 
inventory cost difference between the two routes.  
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6.3.1. Impacts of Cargo Values 
Using the average value of $21.66 per cubic foot for containerized import from Asia to 
United States and $56 per FEU for daily pipeline inventory cost (DPV), the total inventory cost 
difference between the two routes currently is $371 per FEU. After the expansion is finished, the 
difference will be reduced to $220 per FEU. The inventory cost increases with higher cargo 
values, which makes the quicker route more attractive to shippers. To capture the impact of the 
cargo values on the route choice and profit allocation, the models are re-calculated by changing 
DPV value to 30, 40, 56, or 70 dollars/FEU. The players’ Shapley values and Shapley value 
ratios are presented in Figures 6.9 and 6.10. Generally, with higher values of the containerized 
cargo, both absolute Shapley values and the relative ratios of the WCR players get higher while 
those of the ECR players decrease. This is consistent with the fact that the WCR is preferred for 
higher-valued cargoes. As for the OC, its profit increases with the cargo value, but its sharing 
percentage of the total profit does not necessarily follow suit. 
 
 
Figure 6.9. Shapley Value Changes with Cargo Values in S1 
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Figure 6.10. Shapley Value Ratio Changes with Cargo Values in S1 
 
6.3.2. Impacts of Charging Rates 
The lower and upper bounds of charging rates by the Panama Canal and the railroad are 
studied in the same way by changing 10% from the base case. The lower bound of the rate is the 
player’s cost of handling one unit of container, or the lowest rate the player is willing to accept to 
handle one unit of container. The upper bound is the highest rate the player could charge under 
non-cooperative assumption. The results are shown in Figure 6.11 to Figure 6.17.   
When the railroad cost decreases, the absolute Shapley value and the ratio of the value for 
the railroad increase while those values and ratios for P2 and PC decrease (Figure 6.11 and 
Figure 6.12). The OC seems to get higher profit with reduced railroad cost, but its share of the 
total profit actually gets smaller. Terminal 1’s shared profit first increases then decreases, which 
is probably because of the two-sided effect of railroad cost. When the railroad cost is reduced, 
the WCR benefits as a group, but the relative power of Terminal 1 compared with the railroad 
also gets weaker. So when the railroad cost decreases to a certain value, the benefits gained by 
P1 is less significant than the lost power to the railroad.  
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The railroad rate upper bound has almost no impact until it is lowered to 50% of the 
original base case value (Figure 6.13). The railroad and the EC players get smaller profits, while 
the OC and P1 get more profits. The ratios of the sharing follow the same pattern (Figure 6.14). 
 
Figure 6.11. Shapley Value Changes with Railroad Rate Lower Bound in S1 
 
  
Figure 6.12. Shapley Value Ratios Changes with Railroad Rate Lower Bound in S1 
 
 
Figure 6.13. Shapley Value Changes with Railroad Rate Upper Bound in S1 
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Figure 6.14. Shapley Value Ratio Changes with Railroad Rate Upper Bound in S1 
 
As for the Canal charging rate, the effect of changing lower and upper bound is very 
different from the railroad. The ECR players’ Shapley values increase while the WCR players 
and the OC’s profits decrease with the Canal’s cost decrease initially. However, when the lower 
bound of the Canal rate further decreases to below 50% of the base-case assumption value 
($160/FEU), the railroad’s profit starts to increase (Figure 6.15). The ratio changes follow the 
same pattern (Figure 6.16). 
 
Figure 6.15. Shapley Value Changes with Panama Canal Rate Lower Bound in S1 
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Figure 6.16. Shapley Value Ratio Changes with Panama Canal Rate Lower Bound in S1 
 
When the Canal rate’s upper bound increases from 80% to 130% of base case assumption, 
the Shapley values of railroad and the Canal both increase gradually; the OC’s Shapley value 
decreases gradually; and the two terminals have no change (Figure 6.17). The ratio changes 
follow exactly the same pattern (Figure 6.18). In the end, the OC’s charging rate is also analyzed. 
Figure 6.19 clearly shows the OC’s rate only has impact on its own profit. 
 
Figure 6.17. Shapley Value Changes with Panama Canal Rate Upper Bound in S1 
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Figure 6.18. Shapley Value Ratio Changes with Panama Canal Rate Upper Bound in S1 
 
 
Figure 6.19. Shapley Value Changes with OC Rates in S1 
 
6.3.3. Impacts of Capacity Constraint Assumption 
In the end, the assumption of capacity constraint at the terminals is also analyzed by 
varying the capacity level at the terminals. Assuming each terminal could handle 90% or 70% of 
total shipment volume of the OC, the Shapley value ratios are compared with the original values 
with 80% of capacity constraints. Figure 6.20 and Figure 6.21 show how the Shapley values and 
Shapley value ratios change for each player when the capacity at the terminals changes. Again, 
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the capacity constraints clearly have positive impact on the railroad market power and negative 
impact on the OC. For the other players, the impact is not linear. 
 
Figure 6.20. Shapley Value Changes with Terminal Capacity Constraints 
 
 
Figure 6.21. Shapley Value Ratio Changes with Terminal Capacity Constraints 
 
6.4. Conclusions of Case Study 
Four scenarios are conducted, and the model results indicate that if the grand coalition of 
the five players is to form, the OC will ship all or most (depending on if there is enough capacity) 
via the WCR before the Canal expansion. After the expansion is finished and both routes are 
served by the 8,000-TEU vessel, the OC will prefer the all-waterway route via the Panama Canal 
directly to the East Coast because of the higher profit. 
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When there is capacity constraint at the port terminals, the railroad gains more power 
while the OC loses profit due to the constraints. Even assuming that both terminals could handle 
the same amount of containers, the capacity constraint impact on the two terminals is not clear. 
The Panama Canal’s impact on the relative power of the players is much more direct. The EC 
benefits mostly, with OC’s profits increasing at a smaller degree, while the WC players lose 
power due to the increasing power of their competitors.  
The sensitivity analysis of some parameters in Scenario1 shows that the Shapley values 
and value ratios of the five players are very sensitive to most parameter values. Although some 
changes are very easy to expect, some are not very straightforward. Even with only five players 
and two route choices, the interacting relationships are so complicated that the game results are 
hard to predict without the help of model calculation.   
Some general findings could still be drawn from the analysis of Scenario 1. If a player 
could reduce its lower-bound rate (cost), that helps it gain more power in the coalition and get a 
higher profit allocation. The impacts on other players are not very obvious. Although the OC’s 
relative ratio decreases with reduced rail cost because it loses power to railroad, its absolute 
profit improves. On the other hand, both the profit value and the portion of the OC get worse 
when the Canal’s cost decreases. Regarding the different impacts of railroad cost and Canal cost 
on the OC, one explanation is that in Scenario 1 the OC ships through WCR. Thus, lowering the 
railway cost helps the coalition overall as well as the OC. Lowering the Canal cost, on the other 
hand, does not save the grand coalition extra cost.  
Another pattern of the cost impact is that the same route players’ profits change in the 
same direction while different-route players’ profits change in the opposite direction. However, 
this is only for the case with only two routes. When a player is involved in more than one route, 
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it is hard to define its partners or competitors. For this case study, if a transportation operator 
could reduce its cost, it helps increase itself and its partner’s market power. Depending on if it 
handles any containers for the OC, the cost reduction may or may not help the OC’s profit.   
The highest possible rate the player could charge generally reflects its relative market 
power. It works as a threat to the OC in that the OC has to pay a certain price level if no 
cooperation happens. But it also increases its competitors’ profit or does not benefit itself at all, 
as the railroad and the canal rate analyses show.  
When the average cargo value of the container increases, the inventory cost difference 
between the two routes also increases. This makes the WCR a more profitable choice for the OC, 
and the competitive powers of the WCR players generally increase.  
Most of the findings are consistent with real world practice and expectations. Some 
results that are tricky to explain further prove that the shipping market is complicated and many 
factors are making an effect at the same time. The cooperative game solutions offer a measurable 
tool to understand interactive relationships in the ocean shipping industry, to compare the 
relative powers of players, and to make predictions of market equilibrium.  
The Least core (LC) and Minmax core (MMC) are calculated; and they produce very 
similar results with the Shapley value. The advantages of LC and MMC are that they are much 
easier to compute and they also seek a fairness solution. Of the four scenarios, S1 and S3, which 
assume the current status of unfinished Panama-Canal-expansion, both have an empty core. By 
changing some parameter values, the results could change easily. Overall, the grand coalition of 
the five players is very unstable. The main reason is because, essentially, with only one ocean 
carrier, the competition between the two routes is unavoidable. In the next chapter, two 
following games are created supposing the grand coalition does not form. 
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7. FOLLOWING GAMES 
7.1. West Coast Coalition and East Coast Coalition  
As concluded in Chapter 6, the grand coalition of the five players is unstable because of 
the competitive nature between the two routes. In this chapter, two separate possible coalitions 
are derived and tested: the West Coast coalition (WCC) {OC, P1, R} and the East Coast 
coalition (ECC) {OC, P2, PC}. Assuming the grand coalition could not form, the OC either 
cooperates with P1 and R, or cooperates with P2 and PC. Only S1 and S2 are used for illustration.  
The model results are given in Appendix C Table C1, C2, C3, and C4. The Shapley values are 
presented below in Tables 7.1 and 7.2.  
Table 7.1. Shapley Values and Value Ratios for West Coast Coalition {OC, P1, R} 
  P1 R OC Total profit 
S1: West 152.656 1,327.000 558.031 2,037.687 
S2: West 152.656 1,327.000 407.031 1,886.687 
S1 Ratio: West 0.075 0.651 0.274 1.000 
S2 Ratio: West 0.081 0.703 0.216 1.000 
 
Table 7.2. Shapley Values and Value Ratios for East Coast Coalition {OC, P2, PC} 
  P2 PC OC Total profit 
S1: East 153.125 72.813 1732.187 1958.125 
S2: East 152.552 72.083 1955.208 2179.844 
S1 Ratio: East 0.078 0.037 0.885 1.000 
S2 Ratio: East 0.070 0.033 0.897 1.000 
 
Similarly, as in Chapter 6, all values are divided by 64,000 for the purpose of easier 
presenting and interpreting. For the small coalitions, the Shapley value could be directly 
interpreted as a unit profit per FEU for every player. Tables 7.3 to 7.6 prove that all the Shapley 
value solutions are in the core (One small negative value in Table 7.6 is a rounding error.) Both 
coalitions are stable since the core exists. Apparently the ECC is preferred by the OC, because it 
allocates higher profits for the OC. So the ECC will be studied in detail in this chapter. 
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Table 7.3. West Coast Coalition Values in S1 
Players v(S) OC P1 R sum(yi) sum(yi) -v(S) 
OC 555.38 558.03 
  
558.03 2.66 
OC P1 710.69 558.03 152.66
 
710.69 0.00 
OC R 1882.38 558.03 
 
1327.00 1885.03 2.66 
OC P1 R 2037.69 558.03 152.66 1327.00 2037.69 0.00 
P1 R 1477.00 
 
152.66 1327.00 1479.66 2.66 
R 1327.00 
  
1327.00 1327.00 0.00 
P1 150.00 
 
152.66
 
152.66 2.66 
 
Table 7.4. West Coast Coalition Values in S2 
Players v(S) OC P1 R sum(yi) sum(yi) -v(S) 
OC 404.38 407.03 
  
407.03 2.66 
OC P1 559.69 407.03 152.66
 
559.69 0.00 
OC R 1731.38 407.03 
 
1327.00 1734.03 2.66 
OC P1 R 1886.69 407.03 152.66 1327.00 1886.69 0.00 
P1 R 1477.00 
 
152.66 1327.00 1479.66 2.66 
R 1327.00 
  
1327.00 1327.00 0.00 
P1 150.00 
 
152.66
 
152.66 2.66 
 
Table 7.5. East Coast Coalition Values in S1 
Players v(S) OC P2 PC sum(yi) sum(yi) -v(S) 
OC 1716.25 1732.19 
  
1732.19 15.94 
OC P2 1872.50 1732.19 153.13
 
1885.31 12.81 
OC PC 1801.88 1732.19 
 
72.81 1805.00 3.13 
OC P2 PC 1958.13 1732.19 153.13 72.81 1958.13 0.00 
P2 PC 210.00 
 
153.13 72.81 225.94 15.94 
PC 60.00 
  
72.81 72.81 12.81 
P2 150.00 
 
153.13
 
153.13 3.13 
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Table 7.6. East Coast Coalition Values in S2 
Players v(S) OC P2 PC sum(yi) sum(yi) -v(S) 
OC 1940.63 1955.21 
  
1955.21 14.58 
OC P2 2095.63 1955.21 152.55
 
2107.76 12.14 
OC PC 2024.69 1955.21 
 
72.08 2027.29 2.60 
OC P2 PC 2180.00 1955.21 152.55 72.08 2179.84 -0.16 
P2 PC 210.00 
 
152.55 72.08 224.64 14.64 
PC 60.00 
  
72.08 72.08 12.08 
P2 150.00 
 
152.55
 
152.55 2.55 
 
The ECC gets slightly lower total profit than the grand coalition. In S1, both P2 and PC 
get better results in the ECC than in the grand coalition, although the OC actually gets less. In S2, 
all the players in ECC get almost the same as the result in the grand coalition game.  
Every player in the small coalition gains extra profit compared with playing as singletons. For 
example, as shown in Table 7.5, the OC gains an extra $15.94 per FEU, the PC gains an extra 
$12.81 per FEU, and P2 gains an extra $3.13 per FEU, compared with playing individually 
against the rest of players. The total extra profit gained by all three players in the ECC is $31.88 
per FEU. To prove that this amount is the exact total gain of this coalition due to the cooperating 
benefit, the coalition value is estimated again assuming there is no benefit of cooperating, i.e., no 
transit time saving. Results are pasted in Appendix C Table C5. The results are compared in 
Table 7.7 below. The cooperation of the three players adds a total of $31.88 per FEU to the 
coalition profit, assuming transit time is saved 0.5 days at the terminal and at the Canal. This 
benefit gained by the coalition is allocated to each player based on Shapley value calculation 
rules. 
Table 7.7. Shapley Value Changes Due to Cooperation of ECC in S1 
  P2 PC OC Total profit 
S1:Cooperation Benefit 153.125 72.813 1732.187 1958.125 
S1: No-Cooperation Benefit 150.000 60.000 1716.250 1926.250 
S1 Changes 3.125 12.813 15.938 31.875 
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The Shapley Value is by far the most popular allocation method in cooperative game 
theory. Of the total profit of $1,958.125 for the coalition in Scenario 1, P2 gets a profit of 
$153.125, the PC gets a profit of $72.813, and the OC gets the rest. Considering the cost of $150 
per FEU for P2 and $160 per FEU for PC, that means the OC would pay $303.125 per FEU to P2 
and $232.813 per FEU to PC. Note the highest rates charged by the two players under non-
cooperative assumption are $300 and $220 per FEU, respectively. The collaboration between the 
three players saves transit time and operating cost for the OC. The cooperative game theory 
proves that when the three players negotiate prices, the terminal and the Canal actually get more 
than the amount they would charge if no cooperation exists, but the OC still benefits because the 
cost saved from cooperating is more than the extra amount it pays to other players. How much of 
the benefit the OC has to return to the other two players depends on the relative market powers 
of the three players. In order to have a stable coalition, the division of total benefits has to be un-
dominated by any other allocation method. When the Shapley value is in the core, the allocation 
method is un-dominated and stable.   
Comparing the before and after expansion scenario results (S1 vs. S2), the benefit of 
using a larger vessel is mostly gained by the OC. The Canal, on the other hand, has almost no 
change of profit. The reason for this “unfair” result is partly because in Scenario 2, the lower and 
upper bound of the Canal rate is assumed as unchanged. In reality, it is expected the Canal 
should increase both its cost and maximum charging rates. In the next section, sensitivity 
analysis on the Canal’s cost and rate are conducted to analyze how those values will affect the 
Canal’s role in the coalition. 
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Least core and Minmax core are also calculated (Table 7.8, 7.9). Similarly, like the grand 
coalition, both methods produce very similar results to the Shapley value solutions for the ECC 
(Figure 7.1, 7.2). Clearly, the core exists for ECC in both S1 and S2. 
Table 7.8. Least Core for ECC in S1 
Scenario epsilon P2 PC OC Total profit 
S1 -3.125 153.125 82.500 1722.500 1958.125 
S2 -2.656 152.656 81.719 1945.625 2180.000 
 
Table 7.9. Minmax Core for ECC in S1 
Scenario eta P2 PC OC Total profit 
S1 1.003 150.480 79.629 1728.016 1958.125 
S2 1.002 150.366 79.256 1950.378 2180.000 
 
 
Figure 7.1. Comparisons of Shapley Value, LC, MMC for ECC in S1 
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Figure 7.2. Comparisons of Shapley Value, LC, MMC for ECC in S2 
 
7.2. Sensitivity Analysis for the Following Games 
Sensitivity analysis on some parameter values is conducted for the ECC. The cost of 
Terminal 2 and the Canal are analyzed first. Decreasing the Canal cost (CRL) by $16 per FEU 
will increase its Shapley value by exactly $16 per FEU (Table 7.10). Similarly, decreasing 
Terminal 2’s cost (PRL2) by $15 per FEU will increase its allocated profit by $15 per FEU 
(Table 7.11). The cost reduction has benefit to the whole coalition, but all the benefit is allocated 
to the player itself.  
Table 7.10. Shapley Value Changes with PC Lower Bound Rate in S1 
  P2 PC OC 
CRL0.5 153 153 1732 
CRL0.6 153 137 1732 
CRL0.7 153 121 1732 
CRL0.8 153 105 1732 
CRL0.9 153 89 1732 
Base 153 73 1732 
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Table 7.11. Shapley Value Changes with P2 Lower Bound Rate in S1 
  P2 PC OC 
PRL0.5 228 73 1732 
PRL0.6 213 73 1732 
PRL0.7 198 73 1732 
PRL0.8 183 73 1732 
PRL0.9 168 73 1732 
Base 153 73 1732 
 
As shown in Table 7.12, increasing the Canal rate upper bound (CRU) by 1% ($22 per 
FEU) will increase its Shapley value by 1% ($22 per FEU) and decrease the OC’s value by the 
same amount. Terminal 2 is not impacted. The same impact of changing the terminal upper 
bound rate (PRU2) happens (Table 7.13). That is because the rate is a side payment inside the 
coalition, and has no impact on the coalition’s value.  
Table 7.12. Shapley Value and Ratio Changes with PC Upper Bound Rate in S1 
  P2 PC OC 
CRU0.8 153.13 28.81 1776.19 
CRU0.9 153.13 50.81 1754.19 
Base 153.13 72.81 1732.19 
CRU1.1 153.13 94.81 1710.19 
CRU1.2 153.13 116.81 1688.19 
CRU1.3 153.13 138.81 1666.19 
CRU0.8 Ratio 0.08 0.01 0.91 
CRU0.9 Ratio 0.08 0.03 0.90 
Base Ratio 0.08 0.04 0.88 
CRU1.1 Ratio 0.08 0.05 0.87 
CRU1.2 Ratio 0.08 0.06 0.86 
CRU1.3 Ratio 0.08 0.07 0.85 
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Table 7.13. Shapley Value and Ratio Changes with P2 Upper Bound Rate in S1 
  P2 PC OC 
PRU0.8 93.13 72.81 1792.19 
PRU0.9 123.13 72.81 1762.19 
Base 153.13 72.81 1732.19 
PRU1.1 183.13 72.81 1702.19 
PRU1.2 213.13 72.81 1672.19 
PRU1.3 243.13 72.81 1642.19 
PRU0.8 Ratio 0.05 0.04 0.92 
PRU0.9 Ratio 0.06 0.04 0.90 
Base Ratio 0.08 0.04 0.88 
PRU1.1 Ratio 0.09 0.04 0.87 
PRU1.2 Ratio 0.11 0.04 0.85 
PRU1.3 Ratio 0.12 0.04 0.84 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the OC’s payment to the Canal is higher than the 
Canal’s upper-bound rate. Increasing the upper-bound value increases the payment at the same 
rate, and narrows the profit ratio between the Canal and the OC. Reducing the lower bound value, 
on the other hand, not only increases the Canal’s profit and profit ratio to the OC, but also 
increases the total coalition’s profit. In conclusion, the lower-bound value, representing the cost 
of the player, could reflect a player’s absolute attribution to any coalition. The upper bound value 
somehow reflects the player’s relative market power to other players. So far, lowering the cost of 
a player (PC or P2) and increasing its upper bound rate both help improve its Shapley value.  
When the expansion is finished, it is expected that the Panama Canal will have both 
higher costs and higher rates. To obtain a clearer understanding of the Panama Canal expansion’s 
impact, Scenario 2 is used to conduct another sensitivity study of the changing impact of these 
two factors simultaneously. Table 7.14 shows how the Shapley Value would change when both 
the lower and upper bounds of the Canal rate are increased by 1% in S2. The PC will get $6 per 
FEU more when the lower bound is increased by $16 and the upper bound is increased by $22 
per FEU. The OC will get $22 per FEU less due to the increase of the upper bound rate. Table 
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7.15 shows how the Shapley Value would change when both the lower and upper bounds of 
Terminal 2 rate are increased by 1% in S2. P1 will get $15 per FEU more when the lower bound 
is increased by $15 and the upper bound is increased by $30 per FEU. The OC will get $30 less 
due to the increase of the upper bound rate. 
Table 7.14. Shapley Value and Ratio Changes with CRL and CRU in S2 
  P2 PC OC 
CRLCRU1.3 152.55 90.08 1889.21 
CRLCRU1.2 152.55 84.08 1911.21 
CRUCRL1.1 152.55 78.08 1933.21 
Base (S2) 152.55 72.08 1955.21 
CRU1.3 Ratio 0.072 0.042 0.886 
CRU1.2 Ratio 0.071 0.039 0.890 
CRU1.1 Ratio 0.071 0.036 0.893 
Base Ratio 0.070 0.033 0.897 
 
Table 7.15. Shapley Value and Ratio Changes with PRL and PRU in S2 
  P2 PC OC 
PRLPRU1.3 197.55 72.08 1865.21 
PRLPRU1.2 182.55 72.08 1895.21 
PRLPRU1.1 167.55 72.08 1925.21 
Base (S2) 152.55 72.08 1955.21 
CRU1.3 Ratio 0.093 0.034 0.874 
CRU1.2 Ratio 0.085 0.034 0.882 
CRU1.1 Ratio 0.077 0.033 0.889 
Base Ratio 0.070 0.033 0.897 
 
It seems the impacts of lower and upper bound rates are linear on the players’ Shapley 
values and are uncorrelated in the ECC. If the Canal operator could increase its rate more than 
the increased cost due to the expansion, the PC will have improved profit allocation in the ECC 
after the expansion is finished. 
7.3. Conclusions of Following Games 
Two small coalitions are analyzed and both have stable Shapley value solutions. 
Compared with the two small coalitions, the grand coalition has the highest total profit and offers 
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the OC the highest profit allocation. However, all the other players get better profits in their 
small coalition than in the grand coalition. Comparing the two small coalitions, the OC prefers 
the East Coast Coalition {OC, P2, PC} because it offers a higher profit than the West Coast 
Coalition {OC, P1, R}.  
Using the ECC to illustrate, the Shapley values allocate the benefits of cooperation to 
each player in the coalition {OC, P2, PC}. The allocation is efficient because the sum of benefit 
to each player is equal to the total benefit of the coalition. Because the Shapley value solution for 
the small coalitions is in the core, the allocation is also stable. LC and MMC provide very similar 
results to the Shapley Value. 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted. A player’s cost reduction has benefit to the whole 
coalition, but all the benefit is allocated to the player itself. The cost in some way reflects a 
player’s absolute attribution to a coalition. On the other hand, the player’s upper bound rate 
affects its relative market power to the OC. It has no impact on the coalition’s value, and only 
changes the allocation difference between the player and the OC. Simultaneous changes of the 
PC’s upper and lower bound rates are tested, as well as P2’s upper and lower bound rates. It 
seems the impacts of lower and upper bound rates are linear and are not correlated in the small 
coalition. 
The cost and rate changes’ impact on players’ profit values and ratios is very different 
from the grand coalition analysis in Chapter 6. The grand coalition has more complicated 
competition-cooperation relationships within its members. In contrast, the ECC has only three 
players and no competition exists among them. When more players are involved and more 
shipping chains and routes are available, the market becomes more complex and prediction of 
corporation/competition results could not be easily made intuitively. Using game theory to 
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analyze the situation becomes more necessary for those situations. And, as shown by this case 
study, the Shapley value, LC, and MMC all have successfully analyzed the interacting 
relationship.  
The last conclusion regards the Panama Canal expansion effect. In the ECC, the PC will 
not get a better profit if holding the Canal rate’s upper bound and lower bound constant. If, as 
expected, the Panama Canal operator will increase its rate more than the increased cost after the 
expansion, the PC will have improved profit allocation in the ECC after the expansion is finished.  
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8. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1. Summary of the Problem 
The container shipping market is confronted with many challenges and has caught wide 
attention of many researchers. In addition to uncertainties and congestion problems, the 
complicated interacting relationships between the various agents are continuously changing and 
have important and direct impact on the shipment routes, volume, and prices. Different 
stakeholders along the shipment chain have different, very often conflicting, economic goals and 
may have cooperation or competition relationships. Their different market power impacts the 
negotiation process and how the profits/cost savings are divided.  
One type of existing approaches to cargo spatial distribution problems uses optimization 
modeling and usually ignores the impact of stakeholders interactions. Another type either 
implicitly models the competition equilibrium of carriers and shippers, like Network Equilibrium 
Models, or explicity evaluates some types of non-cooperative strategies or cooperative solutions 
in the system. It is noticed that more comprehensive applications of non-cooperative game theory 
and some types of cooperative game approaches on the freight network planning problems began 
to merge. Some of those also used multi-level programming programs to examine the hierarchy 
relationships. But the applications are rare and apparently at an early stage.  
In this dissertation, the cooperative game theory is utilized to solve the U.S. containerized 
import shipment optimization problem, and to investigate the relationships between the players. 
Bi-level optimization models are built to capture the hierarchy structure of the ocean shipping 
industry. Different types of coalitions and competition-cooperation schemes for the main players 
are assumed and solved using different bi-level models. The model results are input into 
cooperative game solutions. The Shapley value, the core, Least core, and Minmax core are 
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calculated to understand, predict, and interpret the player relationships, optimal shipment routes, 
and strategic operational decisions in complex multi-agent container shipping systems. 
8.2. Summary of Model Results  
A case study with only five players is used to illustrate model results and coalition 
formations. Four scenarios are conducted and the model results indicate, if the grand coalition of 
the five players is to form, the OC will ship all or most (depending on if there is enough capacity) 
via the WCR before the Canal expansion. After the expansion is finished and both routes are 
served by the 8,000-TEU vessel, the OC will prefer the ECR. 
The grand coalition in Chapter 6 is found as unstable; and the core does not exist for 
some scenarios. Two small coalitions are analyzed in Chapter 7 and both have stable Shapley 
value solutions. Compared with the two small coalitions, the grand coalition has the highest total 
profit and offers the OC the highest profit allocation. However, all the other players get better 
profits in their small coalition than in the grand coalition. Comparing the two small coalitions, 
the OC prefers the East Coast Coalition {OC, P2, PC} because it offers a higher profit than the 
West Coast Coalition {OC, P1, R}.  
Sensitivity analyses are conducted for both the grand coalition game and the ECC game. 
The grand coalition game has five players belonging to two competing shipment chains, while 
the ECC game has only three players and no competition relationship exists. As expected, the 
influence of the parameter values’ changes is easier to observe in the ECC game than in the 
grand coalition. In general, if a player could reduce its cost, it will earn additional market power 
in the coalition and a higher profit allocation. In the ECC, where no competition relationship 
exists among the members, the increase of its profit is equal to the reduction of its cost. However, 
in the grand coalition where the inter-relationship is more complicated, a player’s profit increase 
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is less than its cost reduction; and some benefit is allocated to the OC or other players. On the 
other hand, a player’s upper bound rate is the highest rate that it could charge in a non-
cooperative market, and affects its relative market power in relation to its coalition members.  
Sensitivity analysis on the average cargo value in grand coalition proves that the quicker 
route is preferred for higher-valued cargoes, as more pipeline inventory cost is saved, ceteris 
paribus. In the grand coalition, the ECR players (P2 and PC) both benefit from the Canal 
expansion in terms of both Shapley value and unit profit even when the Canal’s rate range is 
assumed unchanged. However, when there is capacity constraint at the East Coast terminal, EC 
players’ Shapley values increase due to the expansion, but their unit profits actually decrease. In 
the ECC, the PC will not get a better profit if holding the Canal rate’s upper bound and lower 
bound constant. All the benefit to the coalition due to the Panama Canal expansion is gained by 
the OC. If, as expected, the Panama Canal operator will increase its rate more than the increased 
cost after the expansion, the PC will have improved profit allocation in the ECC after the 
expansion is finished.  
8.3. Implications 
The different solution results of the 15 different bi-level models are a clear indication that, 
with different cooperation schemes, the OC will have different route choices and rate payments 
to other players. Ignoring the relationships of multiple entities fails to understand the real 
container shipping market.  
The finding that the grand coalition for the case study is very unstable is mainly because 
there are two competing routes for one OC. That will not be necessarily true if more players are 
added to the game. And actually, by changing some parameter values, the grand coalition for this 
case study might have an un-empty core. Similarly, although the ECC is preferred by P2 and PC 
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for this case study, the result may change if the parameter values and number of players in the 
game are changed. For each new case, the models have to be re-built and computed and solutions 
have to be re-calculated. 
Based on the case study, the Panama Canal’s expansion clearly has a positive impact on 
the relative market power of the ECR and a negative impact on the WCR when there is no 
capacity constraint problem. The Canal expansion has a two-sided impact on the OC in that it 
may save vessel operating costs for the OC, and may also hurt the OC’s relative market power 
and final profit allocation.  
Most of the findings are consistent with real world practice and expectations. Some 
results that are tricky to explain further prove that the shipping market is complicated and many 
factors are having an effect at the same time. When many players are involved in the market, 
player relationships will become more complicated, and the corporation and competition results 
could hardly be predicted intuitively. The cooperative game solutions offer a measurable tool to 
understand the interactive relationships in the ocean shipping industry, to compare the relative 
powers of players, and to make predictions of market equilibrium.  
8.4. Contributions 
 The research contributes to the literature in a number of aspects. 
1. Compared with studies that ignore player relationships, this dissertation incorporates four 
types of players in the U.S. containerized import market to analyze the optimal container 
shipment problem using cooperative game theory approaches. In contrast to some studies 
that focused on interactions of one or two types of players, the four types of players in 
this study are from different levels of the shipment chain, and their relationships are 
much more complicated than relationships among the same-level players. Different 
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solution approaches, including the core, Shapley value, Least core, and Minmax core, are 
used. From the extensive literature review, there are almost no studies of this type. 
2. The hierarchy structure between the OC and the other players is captured by Bi-level 
Programming Problems (BLPP). In all, 16 bi-level models are built and calculated and 32 
coalitions are analyzed for the case study. Following games are also added after the grand 
coalition is considered unstable.  
3. While the Panama Canal expansion has been discussed vastly by scholars, no studies 
have quantitatively evaluated its impact on the container flow pattern or the market 
power of the different stakeholders in the container shipping market. This study shows 
that by comparing the before and after scenarios, the Panama Canal expansion’s impact 
on the market could be directly investigated. By varying assumptions on terminal 
capacity constraints and other parameter values, insights on how the players interact with 
each other have also been gained. 
8.5. Limitations, Challenges and Suggestions for Future Research 
The five-player case study suffices for the purpose of demonstrating how the bi-level 
models are built and computed, and how the cooperative game solutions are calculated and 
interpreted for the U.S. container import market. But it is not sufficient to get a thorough picture 
of the market status, or even predict future market equilibrium. Similarly, a complete 
understanding of the Panama Canal’s expansion and capacity constraint impact could not be 
obtained at this point.  
In order to achieve that goal, more players need to be added to include nationwide 
containerized-import shipments. However, to include just 10 major U.S. ports, two origins (Asia 
and Europe), 48 contiguous states as the inland destinations, and five shipping companies, there 
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will be at least 10 port operators, four U.S. railroad operators (BNSF, CSX, NS, CN), one 
trucking operator (assuming there is no competition among all trucking companies), two canal 
operators (Panama Canal and Suez Canal), and five OCs. With 22 players, the total number of 
possible coalitions will be 4,194,304 (222). For a simplier version with only five port operators, 
one railroad operator, one trucking operator, two canal operators, and three ocean carriers, there 
will still be 2,048 (211) coalition combinations. One solution to the large number of coalitions is 
to eliminate some “unrealistic” coalitions in the beginning. For example, assume there is no 
cooperation between the ports. When capacity constraints at some nodes or links are further 
assumed, the problem will become more intricate. The number of mathematical models and the 
complexity of each model will both rise dramatically. It is a challenge to model such a complex 
system using cooperative game theory approach.  
Fixed demand is assumed in the dissertation, and the shippers’ role is not considered. To 
have a demand function instead of the fixed value, the shippers’ interaction with the OC could be 
analyzed. But the model will become hard to solve and the global solution algorithm has to be 
established. Trucking companies are not considred in the case study; and the demand destination 
is purposely selected to be very near Terminal 2. If a more interior destination is used instead, an 
inland carrier for the ECR has to be added, which will affect the power structure of the market.  
Another important player that has been neglected in this study is the Suez Canal, due to 
the time limitation. A shift in trade lanes is underway already as some big shipping companies 
(e.g., Maersk Lines) are already transpassing via the Suez Canal instead of the Panama Canal for 
the Asia to East Coast routes. As the Panama Canal expansion is not finished yet, carriers have 
found that using large PostPanamax vessels on the Suez route to the East Coast is more 
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profitable than through the Panama Canal. Adding the Suez Canal as another player is expected 
to change the power structure of the players, especially for the Panama Canal.  
The Shapley value calculation is computatively extensive. As shown by this study, the 
LC and MMC provide very similar results to the Shapley Value, and have the advantages of 
much easier computation requirements and seeking fairness. For future research on a more 
complicated game, these two could be used instead of the Shapley value.  
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APPENDIX A. LIST OF MODELS AND CONSTRAINTS 
Table A. 1. Model List for Case Study 
Model & Level Coalition Value Objective Function 
𝑀0 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶}) = 𝑣01 max�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝑅𝑝1 − 𝑅𝑝2 −  𝑅𝑝𝑐 − 𝑅𝑟� = 𝑣01 
𝑀0 Level 2 𝑣({𝑅,𝑃1,𝑃2,𝑃𝐶}) = 𝑣02 max�𝑓𝑝1 + 𝑓𝑝2 + 𝑓𝑝𝑐 + 𝑓𝑟� = 𝑣02 
M1 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑃1}) = 𝑣11 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝑅𝑝2 −  𝑅𝑝𝑐 − 𝑅𝑟� = 𝑣11 
M1 Level2 𝑣({𝑃2,𝑃𝐶,𝑅}) = 𝑣12 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑝2 + 𝑓𝑝𝑐 + 𝑓𝑟� = 𝑣12 
M2 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑃2}) = 𝑣21 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝑅𝑝1 − 𝐶𝑝2 −  𝑅𝑝𝑐 − 𝑅𝑟� = 𝑣21 
M2 Level 2 𝑣({𝑃1,𝑃𝐶,𝑅}) = 𝑣22 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑝1 + 𝑓𝑝𝑐 + 𝑓𝑟� = 𝑣22 
M3 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑃𝐶}) = 𝑣31 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝑅𝑝1 − 𝑅𝑝2 −  𝐶𝑝𝑐 − 𝑅𝑟� = 𝑣31 
M3 Level 2 𝑣({𝑃1,𝑃2,𝑅}) = 𝑣32 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑝2 + 𝑓𝑝1 + 𝑓𝑟� = 𝑣32 
M4 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑅}) = 𝑣41 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝑅𝑝1 − 𝑅𝑝2 −  𝑅𝑝𝑐 − 𝐶𝑟� = 𝑣41 
M4 Level 2 𝑣({𝑃2,𝑃𝐶,𝑃1}) = 𝑣42 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑝2 + 𝑓𝑝𝑐 + 𝑓𝑝1� = 𝑣42 
M5 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑃1,𝑃2}) = 𝑣51 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝐶𝑝2 −  𝑅𝑝𝑐 − 𝑅𝑟� = 𝑣51 
M5 Level 2 𝑣({𝑅,𝑃𝐶}) = 𝑣52 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑟 + 𝑓𝑝𝑐� = 𝑣52 
M6 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑃1,𝑃𝐶}) = 𝑣61 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝑅𝑝2 −  𝐶𝑝𝑐 − 𝑅𝑟� = 𝑣61 
M6 Level 2 𝑣({𝑅,𝑃2}) = 𝑣62 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑟 + 𝑓𝑝2� = 𝑣62 
M7 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑃1,𝑅}) = 𝑣71 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝑅𝑝2 −  𝑅𝑝𝑐 − 𝐶𝑟� = 𝑣71 
M7 Level 2 𝑣({𝑃2,𝑃𝐶}) = 𝑣72 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑝𝑐 + 𝑓𝑝2� = 𝑣72 
M8 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑃𝐶,𝑃2}) = 𝑣81 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝑅𝑝1 − 𝐶𝑝2 −  𝐶𝑝𝑐 − 𝑅𝑟� = 𝑣81 
M8 Level 2 𝑣({𝑅,𝑃1}) = 𝑣82 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑟 + 𝑓𝑝1� = 𝑣82 
M9 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑅,𝑃2}) = 𝑣91 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝑅𝑝1 − 𝐶𝑝2 −  𝑅𝑝𝑐 − 𝐶𝑟� = 𝑣91 
M9 Level 2 𝑣({𝑃1,𝑃𝐶}) = 𝑣92 𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑝𝑐 + 𝑓𝑝1� = 𝑣92 
M10 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑅,𝑃𝐶}) = 𝑣101  𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝑅𝑝1 − 𝑅𝑝2 −  𝐶𝑝𝑐 − 𝐶𝑟� = 𝑣101  
M10 Level 2 𝑣({𝑃1,𝑃2}) = 𝑣102  𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑝2 + 𝑓𝑝1� = 𝑣102  
M11 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑃1,𝑃2,𝑃𝐶}) = 𝑣111  𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝐶𝑝2 −  𝐶𝑝𝑐 − 𝑅𝑟� = 𝑣111  
M11 Level 2 𝑣({𝑅}) = 𝑣112  𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑓𝑟) = 𝑣112  
M12 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑅,𝑃2,𝑃1}) = 𝑣121  𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝐶𝑝2 −  𝑅𝑝𝑐 − 𝐶𝑟� = 𝑣121  
M12 Level 2 𝑣({𝑃𝐶}) = 𝑣122  𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑝𝑐� = 𝑣122  
M13 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑅,𝑃𝐶,𝑃1}) = 𝑣131  𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝑅𝑝2 −  𝐶𝑝𝑐 − 𝐶𝑟� = 𝑣131  
M13 Level 2 𝑣({𝑃2}) = 𝑣132  𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑝2� = 𝑣132  
M14 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑅,𝑃2,𝑃𝐶}) = 𝑣141  𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝑅𝑝1 − 𝐶𝑝2 −  𝐶𝑝𝑐 − 𝐶𝑟� = 𝑣141  
M14 Level 2 𝑣({𝑃1}) = 𝑣142  𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑓𝑝1� = 𝑣142  
M15 Level 1 𝑣({𝑂𝐶,𝑅,𝑃1,𝑃2,𝑃𝐶}) = 𝑣151  𝑚𝑎𝑥�𝑅𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑜𝑐 − 𝐶𝑝1 − 𝐶𝑝2 −  𝐶𝑝𝑐 − 𝐶𝑟� = 𝑣151  
M15 Level 2 𝑣({∅}) = 𝑣152 = 0 𝑚𝑎𝑥(∅) = 𝑣152  
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𝑀0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢1 + 𝑢5 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢2 + 𝑢6 = 0 
 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢3 + 𝑢7 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢4 + 𝑢8 = 0 
𝑢1 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢2 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢3 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝑈 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
𝑢4 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝑈 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑢5 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢6 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢7 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
𝑢8 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝐿 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑀1 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢2 + 𝑢6 = 0 
 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢3 + 𝑢7 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢4 + 𝑢8 = 0 
𝑢2 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢3 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝑈 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
𝑢4 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝑈 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑢6 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢7 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
𝑢8 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝐿 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑀2 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢1 + 𝑢5 = 0 
 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢3 + 𝑢7 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢4 + 𝑢8 = 0 
𝑢1 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢3 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝑈 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
𝑢4 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝑈 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑢5 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢7 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
𝑢8 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝐿 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑀3 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢1 + 𝑢5 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢2 + 𝑢6 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢3 + 𝑢7 = 0 
𝑢1 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢2 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢3 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝑈 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
𝑢5 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢6 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢7 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
 
𝑀4 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 = 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢1 + 𝑢5 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢2 + 𝑢6 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢4 + 𝑢8 = 0 
𝑢1 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢2 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢4 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝑈 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑢5 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢6 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢8 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝐿 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑀5 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢3 + 𝑢7 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢4 + 𝑢8 = 0 
𝑢3 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝑈 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
𝑢4 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝑈 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑢7 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
𝑢8 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝐿 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
 
 
117 
 
Table A.2. Constraint Sets (continued) 
Model  Original Constraints Constraints after KKT Transformation 
𝑀6 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢2 + 𝑢6 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢3 + 𝑢7 = 0 
𝑢2 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢3 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝑈 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
𝑢6 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢7 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
 
𝑀7 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢2 + 𝑢6 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢4 + 𝑢8 = 0 
𝑢2 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢4 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝑈 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑢6 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢8 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝐿 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑀8 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑅𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑅𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢1 + 𝑢5 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢3 + 𝑢7 = 0 
𝑢1 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢3 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝑈 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
𝑢5 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢7 ∗ (𝑅𝑅𝐿 − 𝑟𝑟) = 0 
 
𝑀9 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢1 + 𝑢5 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢4 + 𝑢8 = 0 
𝑢1 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢4 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝑈 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑢5 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢8 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝐿 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑀10 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢1 + 𝑢5 = 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢2 + 𝑢6 = 0 
𝑢1 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢2 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢5 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢6 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
 
𝑀12 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝐶𝑅𝐿 ≤ 𝑐𝑟 ≤ 𝐶𝑅𝑈 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢4 + 𝑢8 = 0 
𝑢4 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝑈 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑢8 ∗ (𝐶𝑅𝐿 − 𝑐𝑟) = 0 
𝑀13 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿2 ≤ 𝑝𝑟2 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈2 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢2 − 𝑢2 + 𝑢6 = 0 
𝑢2 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
𝑢6 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿2 − 𝑝𝑟2) = 0 
 
𝑀14 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑃𝑅𝐿1 ≤ 𝑝𝑟1 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑈1 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 , 𝑝𝑟𝑗 , 𝑟𝑟, 𝑐𝑟,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
𝑓𝑒𝑢1 − 𝑢1 + 𝑢5 = 0 
𝑢1 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝑈1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
𝑢5 ∗ (𝑃𝑅𝐿1 − 𝑝𝑟1) = 0 
 
𝑀15 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
 
∑ �𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗�𝑗 = 𝐷𝑀𝐷  
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑎𝑝(𝑗) 
𝑓𝑒𝑢𝑗 ,𝑢𝑖 ≥ 0 
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APPENDIX B. MODEL RESULTS 
Table B.1. S1 Results 
Model L1_Players L1_Profit L2_Profit FEU_LA FEU_NF PR_LA PR_NF RR PC 
0 OC 109,840,000 13,440,000 0 64,000 225 300 1,617 220 
1 OC P1 109,840,000 13,440,000 0 64,000 0 300 2,037 220 
2 OC P2 119,840,000 3,840,000 0 64,000 225 0 1,620 220 
3 OC PC 115,320,000 9,600,000 0 64,000 224 300 1,620 0 
4 OC R 120,472,000 9,600,000 64,000 0 300 300 0 220 
5 OC P1 P2 119,840,000 3,840,000 0 64,000 0 0 1,685 220 
6 OC P1 Pc 115,320,000 9,600,000 0 64,000 0 300 1,623 0 
7 OC P1 R 130,412,000 0 64,000 0 0 178 0 220 
8 OC P2 PC 125,320,000 0 0 64,000 224 0 1,503 0 
9 OC P2 R 120,472,000 9,600,000 64,000 0 300 0 0 203 
10 OC PC R 120,472,000 9,600,000 64,000 0 300 191 0 0 
11 OC P1 P2 PC 125,320,000 0 0 64,000 0 0 1,664 0 
12 OC P1 P2 R 130,412,000 0 64,000 0 0 0 0 186 
13 OC P1 PC R 130,412,000 0 64,000 0 0 300 0 0 
14 OC P2 PC R 125,320,000 0 0 64,000 221 0 0 0 
15 OC P1 P2 PC R 130,412,000 0 64,000 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Table B.2. S2 Results 
model L1_Players L1_Profit L2_Profit FEU_LA FEU_Nk PR_LA PR_Nk RR PC 
0 OC 124,200,000 13,440,000 0 64,000 225 300 1,618 220 
1 OC P1 124,200,000 13,440,000 0 64,000 0 300 2,179 220 
2 OC P2 134,120,000 3,840,000 0 64,000 225 0 1,405 220 
3 OC PC 129,580,000 9,600,000 0 64,000 225 300 1,613 0 
4 OC R 124,200,000 13,440,000 0 64,000 216 300 0 220 
5 OC P1 P2 134,120,000 3,840,000 0 64,000 0 0 1,626 220 
6 OC P1 Pc 129,580,000 9,600,000 0 64,000 0 300 1,619 0 
7 OC P1 R 124,200,000 13,440,000 0 64,000 0 300 0 220 
8 OC P2 PC 139,520,000 0 0 64,000 222 0 1,586 0 
9 OC P2 R 134,120,000 3,840,000 0 64,000 300 0 0 220 
10 OC PC R 129,580,000 9,600,000 0 64,000 234 300 0 0 
11 OC P1 P2 PC 139,520,000 0 0 64,000 0 0 1,548 0 
12 OC P1 P2 R 134,120,000 3,840,000 0 64,000 0 0 0 220 
13 OC P1 PC R 129,580,000 9,600,000 0 64,000 0 300 0 0 
14 OC P2 PC R 139,520,000 0 0 64,000 168 0 0 0 
15 OC P1 P2 PC R 139,520,000 0 0 64,000 0 0 0 0 
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Table B.3. S3 Results 
 
model L1_Players L1_Profit L2_Profit FEU_LA FEU_Nk PR_LA PR_Nk RR PC 
0 OC 96,286,400 29,657,600 12,800 51,200 300 300 2,280 220 
1 OC P1 98,274,400 27,737,600 12,800 51,200 0 300 2,280 220 
2 OC P2 104,286,400 21,977,600 12,800 51,200 300 0 2,280 220 
3 OC PC 100,670,400 26,585,600 12,800 51,200 300 300 2,280 0 
4 OC R 123,568,000 10,368,000 51,200 12,800 300 300 0 220 
5 OC P1 P2 106,274,400 20,057,600 12,800 51,200 0 0 2,280 220 
6 OC P1 Pc 102,658,400 24,665,600 12,800 51,200 0 300 2,280 0 
7 OC P1 R 131,520,000 2,688,000 51,200 12,800 0 300 0 220 
8 OC P2 PC 108,670,400 18,905,600 12,800 51,200 300 0 2,280 0 
9 OC P2 R 125,568,000 8,448,000 51,200 12,800 300 0 0 220 
10 OC PC R 124,664,000 9,600,000 51,200 12,800 300 300 0 0 
11 OC P1 P2 PC 110,658,400 16,985,600 12,800 51,200 0 0 2,280 0 
12 OC P1 P2 R 133,520,000 768,000 51,200 12,800 0 0 0 220 
13 OC P1 PC R 132,616,000 1,920,000 51,200 12,800 0 300 0 0 
14 OC P2 PC R 124,350,400 1,920,000 12,800 51,200 300 0 0 0 
15 OC P1 P2 PC R 134,616,000 0 51,200 12,800 0 0 0 0 
 
Table B.4. S4 Results 
model L1_Players L1_Profit L2_Profit FEU_LA FEU_Nk PR_LA PR_Nk RR PC 
0 OC 104,536,000 29,657,600 12,800 51,200 300 300 2,280 220 
1 OC P1 106,524,000 27,737,600 12,800 51,200 0 300 2,280 220 
2 OC P2 112,472,000 21,977,600 12,800 51,200 300 0 2,280 220 
3 OC PC 108,840,000 26,585,600 12,800 51,200 300 300 2,280 0 
4 OC R 121,521,600 12,672,000 12,800 51,200 300 300 0 220 
5 OC P1 P2 114,460,000 20,057,600 12,800 51,200 0 0 2,280 220 
6 OC P1 Pc 110,828,000 24,665,600 12,800 51,200 0 300 2,280 0 
7 OC P1 R 123,509,600 10,752,000 12,800 51,200 0 300 0 220 
8 OC P2 PC 116,792,000 18,905,600 12,800 51,200 300 0 2,280 0 
9 OC P2 R 129,457,600 4,992,000 12,800 51,200 300 0 0 220 
10 OC PC R 125,825,600 9,600,000 12,800 51,200 300 300 0 0 
11 OC P1 P2 PC 118,780,000 16,985,600 12,800 51,200 0 0 2,280 0 
12 OC P1 P2 R 131,445,600 3,072,000 12,800 51,200 0 0 0 220 
13 OC P1 PC R 127,813,600 7,680,000 12,800 51,200 0 300 0 0 
14 OC P2 PC R 133,777,600 1,920,000 12,800 51,200 300 0 0 0 
15 OC P1 P2 PC R 135,765,600 0 12,800 51,200 0 0 0 0 
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APPENDIX C. FOLLOWING GAME RESULTS 
Table C.1. Model Results for {OC, P1, R} in S1 
model L1_Players L1_Profit L2_Profit FEU_LA FEU_Nk PR_LA PR_Nk RR PC 
0 OC 35,544,000 94,528,000 64,000 0 300 225 2,280 191 
1 OC P1 45,484,000 84,928,000 64,000 0 0 225 2,280 196 
4 OC R 120,472,000 9,600,000 64,000 0 300 150 0 162 
7 OC P1 R 130,412,000 0 64,000 0 0 225 0 218 
 
Table C.2. Model Results for {OC, P1, R} in S2 
model L1_Players L1_Profit L2_Profit FEU_LA FEU_Nk PR_LA PR_Nk RR PC 
0 OC 25,880,000 94,528,000 64,000 0 300 299 2,280 188 
1 OC P1 35,820,000 84,928,000 64,000 0 0 151 2,280 190 
4 OC R 110,808,000 9,600,000 64,000 0 300 225 0 189 
7 OC P1 R 120,748,000 0 64,000 0 0 298 0 163 
 
Table C.3. Model Results for {OC, P2, PC} in S1 
model L1_Players L1_Profit L2_Profit FEU_LA FEU_Nk PR_LA PR_Nk RR PC 
0 OC 109,840,000 13,440,000 0 64,000 220 300 1,613 220 
2 OC P2 119,840,000 3,840,000 0 64,000 266 0 1,462 220 
3 OC PC 115,320,000 9,600,000 0 64,000 268 300 2,143 0 
8 OC P2 PC 125,320,000 0 0 64,000 225 0 1,608 0 
 
Table C.4. Model Results for {OC, P2, PC} in S2 
model L1_Players L1_Profit L2_Profit FEU_LA FEU_Nk PR_LA PR_Nk RR PC 
0 OC 124,200,000 13,440,000 0 64,000 283 300 1,618 220 
2 OC P2 134,120,000 3,840,000 0 64,000 225 0 1,232 220 
3 OC PC 129,580,000 9,600,000 0 64,000 224 300 1,479 0 
8 OC P2 PC 139,520,000 0 0 64,000 223 0 1,130 0 
 
Table C.5. Model Results for {OC, P2, PC} with No Cooperating Benefit in S1 
model L1_Players L1_Profit L2_Profit FEU_LA FEU_Nk PR_LA PR_Nk RR PC 
0 OC 109,840,000 13,440,000 0 64,000 220 300 1,613 220 
2 OC P2 119,440,000 3,840,000 0 64,000 150 0 1,616 220 
3 OC PC 113,680,000 9,600,000 0 64,000 224 300 2,222 0 
8 OC P2 PC 123,280,000 0 0 64,000 224 0 1,612 0 
base OC P2 PC 125,320,000 0 0 64,000 225 0 1,608 0 
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